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Abstract 
The research investigate the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary) cohesion problem finding a joint position on the EU 
sanctions against Russia by answering the question: What is behind the Visegrad 
Groups different positions and lack of unity on the EU sanctions towards Russia?. 
To identify what is behind the Visegrad Groups different positions the theory 
spring from Putnam’s two-level game theory and will focus on Tsebelis Nested 
game theory. The two theory´s together enable to map out the Visegrad countries 
different games nested in an arena dynamics consisting of the three different 
arenas: the domestic arena, the supranational arena and the international arena. To 
be able to explain the V4 countries' divided positions, this research will use five 
different hypotheses, which will function as explanatory factors trying to describe 
what is behind each of the V4 countries taken position on the EU sanctions 
against Russia. The result of the research show that the countries positions and 
decisions on the three arenas, from their point of view, can be explained as 
rational choices and strategically decisions taken in the nested game surrounding 
the sanction war against Russia. Due to the fact that each of the V4 countries act 
rational to maximize their goal achievement, a coherence problem occur, which 
makes it hard for the V4 countries to reach an agreement on the “level 3” 
sanctions.  
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EU  European Union 
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NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
Definitions 
 
EU sanctions – “also referred to as restrictive measures – against third countries, 
individuals or entities, are an essential EU foreign policy tool that it uses to pursue 
objectives in accordance with the principles of common Foreign and Security Policy”.1 
 
Economic sanctions - can be divided into trade sanctions and financial penalties. Trade 
sanctions meaning blocking the import and export of goods to and from a state and 
financial sanctions related to the freezing of financial assets and banning money transfers, 
gifts and credit.2 
 
”Level 1” sanctions - consist of diplomatic sanctions. “The diplomatic sanctions adopted 
by the EU included the unilateral suspension of visa facilitation talks, negotiations on the 
New Agreement, and the upcoming EU-Russia summit”.3 
 
”Level 2” sanctions - consist of restrictive measures: ”visa bans, asset freezes and 
political wrist-slapping. The latter includes suspending G8 meetings, halting formal 
bilateral summits and stopping negotiations on Russia’s membership of the OECD, a 
rich-world think-tank, and the International Energy Agency.”4  
 
”Level 3” sanctions - consist of economic sanctions that target entire economic sectors 
such as defence or energy, and which could do more damage to Russia´s economy but 
could potentially also damage Western Europe´s industries5 and furthermore comprising 
unspecified `far-reaching consequences for relations on a broad range of economic 
areas´.6 
                                                
1 European Union External Action, 2015 
2 Statens offentliga utredningar, 2006: 38 
3 Blockmans, Steven, 2014 
4 Charlemagne, 2014 
5 Dalton, Meichtry, Thomas, 2014 
6 Charlemagne, 2014 
  
Table of contents 
1	   The EU faced with a severe thereat to European security in the 21st 
century ............................................................................................................................. 1	  
1.1	   Research question and aim ................................................................................... 2	  
1.2	   Delimitations ........................................................................................................ 3	  
1.2.1	   Choice of case ............................................................................................... 3	  
1.2.2	   Selection of countries .................................................................................... 3	  
1.2.3	   The Visegrad Group ...................................................................................... 4	  
1.2.4	   The Visegrad countries position towards “level 3” sanctions ...................... 4	  
1.2.5	   Time delimitation .......................................................................................... 5	  
1.3	   Outline of the study .............................................................................................. 5	  
2	   Background ............................................................................................................... 6	  
2.1	   The Ukraine conflict ............................................................................................ 6	  
2.2	   EU sanctions against Russia ................................................................................ 7	  
2.3	   Russian retaliatory measures ................................................................................ 8	  
3	   Method and Material .............................................................................................. 10	  
3.1.1	   Research Design ......................................................................................... 10	  
3.1.2	   Material ....................................................................................................... 10	  
3.1.3	   Existing literature ........................................................................................ 11	  
3.1.4	   Contribution to existing literature ............................................................... 11	  
4	   The two-level game and the three-level game ....................................................... 12	  
4.1	   Putnam’s theory of two-level games .................................................................. 12	  
4.2	   Tsebelis Nested Games theory ........................................................................... 13	  
4.3	   Interpretation of the theories .............................................................................. 14	  
4.3.1	   Model of the three-level game .................................................................... 15	  
4.3.2	   Explanation of the Hypothesis .................................................................... 16	  
4.3.3	   Operationalization ....................................................................................... 17	  
4.3.4	   The model of the linkage between arena dynamics and the six 
different hypothesis ................................................................................................. 18	  
4.3.5	   Theoretical assumptions ............................................................................. 19	  
5	   The explanation to the Visegrad countries positions ........................................... 20	  
5.1	   Domestic political ambitions ............................................................................. 20	  
5.1.1	   Poland ......................................................................................................... 20	  
5.1.2	   The Czech Republic .................................................................................... 22	  
5.1.3	   Slovakia ...................................................................................................... 23	  
5.1.4	   Hungary ...................................................................................................... 25	  
5.2	   Business interests ............................................................................................... 27	  
5.2.1	   Poland ......................................................................................................... 28	  
5.2.2	   The Czech Republic .................................................................................... 29	  
  
5.2.3	   Slovakia ...................................................................................................... 30	  
5.2.4	   Hungary ...................................................................................................... 31	  
5.3	   Geopolitical concerns ........................................................................................ 33	  
5.3.1	   Poland ......................................................................................................... 34	  
5.3.2	   The Czech Republic .................................................................................... 35	  
5.3.3	   Slovakia ...................................................................................................... 36	  
5.3.4	   Hungary ...................................................................................................... 36	  
5.4	   The Visegrad countries EU cooperation ............................................................ 36	  
5.4.1	   Poland ......................................................................................................... 37	  
5.4.2	   The Czech Republic .................................................................................... 38	  
5.4.3	   Slovakia ...................................................................................................... 39	  
5.4.4	   Hungary ...................................................................................................... 40	  
5.5	   External cooperation with non-EU countries .................................................... 41	  
5.5.1	   Poland ......................................................................................................... 41	  
5.5.2	   The Czech Republic .................................................................................... 43	  
5.5.3	   Slovakia ...................................................................................................... 44	  
5.5.4	   Hungary ...................................................................................................... 45	  
5.6	   Overview Table hypotheses ............................................................................... 46	  
6	   Discussion ................................................................................................................ 48	  
7	   Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 51	  
8	   References ................................................................................................................ 52	  
  1 
1 The EU faced with a severe thereat to 
European security in the 21st century 
The European Union (EU) is witnessing a military intervention of Russia in 
Ukraine in the 21st century. The Ukraine conflict outbreak (namely Russia´s illegal 
annexation of Crimea) in March 2014 is having serious consequences not only for 
Russia and Ukraine, but potentially threatens to damage the still fragile economic 
recovery in Europe.7 The EU is hit by a complex crisis where its security interests, 
economic interests and normative goals are intertwined and are not easily 
reconciled.8 The EU which represents a unique economic and political partnership 
between 28 European countries, a peace and a cooperation project that has provided 
the member countries with fifty years of peace, stability and prosperity, has now 
imposed sanctions on the major power Russia.9 The situation calls for a strategic 
vision and a thoughtful combination of a variety of policy tools, with sanctions 
being just one of them.10 The Ukraine crisis has brought sanctions to the fore of EU 
foreign policy. Faced with a severe threat to European security, the EU member 
states have responded to the crisis with a double-track approach combining 
diplomacy and sanctions with the primary goal of bringing about a change in 
Russia´s action in Ukraine.11 The EU has officially responded to the Ukraine 
conflict by imposing “level 1” and “level 2” sanctions against Russia, and so far 
managed to remain united over the Ukraine crisis. However, behind the scenes, 
there are now big divisions among EU member states on whether to introduce 
further targeted sanctions in response to Russia´s annexation of Crimea.12 The 
member states have very clearly showed that they have different positions and 
interests on the issue and cannot find a joint stand on “level 3” sanctions (wide 
ranging economic sanctions).13 What is at stake is much more than Ukraine; the 
crisis undermines the post-Cold War security order in Europe and is testing the 
EU´s readiness to stand up in defence of key international norms such as territorial 
integrity and the sovereignty of states, which Russia gravely is violating.14 The EUs 
gradual move towards `tougher´ sanction against Russia together with Russia´s 
countermeasures, hit back on the EU itself and has a significant negative impact on 
                                                
7 Havlik, Peter, 2014: 5 
8 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 9 
9 Europeiska Unionen 
10 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 9 
11 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 3 
12 Dempsey, 2014: 2 
13 Haglund, Fredrik, 2015 
14 Raik, Niklas, Jokela, 2014: 4 
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EU´s economy and especially on certain member states and business sectors.15 
While the option of using military force was excluded, the use of economic 
sanctions was the hardest form of power that the EU could apply against Russia, 
alongside with diplomatic measure.16 The Ukraine crisis have furthermore also 
presented a direct security risk and exposed insecurities in the Visegrad countries – 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The Visegrad countries at first 
managed to stand united in addressing the crisis, however later the individual 
policies of the Visegrad countries towards Russia became visible and left the four 
country´s hopelessly divided.17   
1.1 Research question and aim  
This research aims to investigate the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) cohesion problem finding a joint position on the 
EU`s implementation of “level 3” sanctions against Russia. The study furthermore 
aims to single out the underlying factors to the Visegrad Groups18 (so-called 
“V4”)19 divided positions explaining the different countries rational strategies and 
interests. The research problem consist of the fact that the V4 countries, who 
usually stand united and cooperate on many different issues and furthermore have 
shown an exceptional level of activity in addressing the Ukraine crisis and 
managing to achieve a united position on “level 1” and “level 2” sanctions,20 now 
stand divided on Russia and the implementation of tougher sanctions. The V4 
countries division is visible both when it comes to Russia’s role in Ukraine, 
Russia´s potential imperialistic plans21 and the stand towards the implementation of 
“level 3” sanctions against Russia22 (economic sanctions target entire economic 
sectors).23  
With the objective to create a greater understanding of why the EU member 
states had difficulties finding a unified position in times when Europe faces an 
unusually complex and fragile situation, rising a severe threat to European security, 
this research aim to investigate the following question: 
 
What is behind the Visegrad Groups different positions and lack of unity on the 
EU sanctions towards Russia?  
                                                
15 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 5 
16 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 5 
17 Rácz, 2014: 2 
18 Rácz, 2014: 1-3 
19 Jarábik, 2014 
20 Rácz, 2014: 1-3 
21 Jarábik, 2014  
22 Rácz, 2014: 3  
23 Dalton, Meichtry, Thomas, 2014 
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1.2 Delimitations  
1.2.1 Choice of case 
The choice of case for this study namely the on-going sanction war between the EU 
and Russia, has been made because of the case ability to test the V4 Groups 
cohesion in an interesting way. The case is incredibly complex due to the fact that 
there is many different counties involved in the conflict and because of the 
countries many different interests and relation to the EU, Russia and Ukraine. The 
case furthermore has major consequences for the European security and puts the V4 
countries' ability to cooperate to a head. The case-study has furthermore been 
chosen due to the Ukraine crisis' exceptionality and strategic significance due to a 
combination of big power rivalry, the context of a major European crisis with 
global ramifications and the costs of the sanctions for the EU itself.24 The fact that 
the EU is witnessing a military intervention of Russia in Ukraine in the 21st century 
is a remarkable situation having severe consequences for Europe at large and has 
sent shockwaves throughout the EU´s Eastern neighbourhood. 25  With rare 
exceptions, the EU has not imposed sanctions on major powers in the past. In those 
rare cases the scope of sanctions have been very limited.26 “Few examples are the 
arms embargo on China since 1989; limited and vague trade sanctions on the Soviet 
Union in 1982, and a mild and practically insignificant set of sanctions adopted 
against Russia in 2000 due to the conflict in Chechnya” 27 . The EU have 
implemented harsh EU sanctions before but then on relatively weaker subjects and 
have caused no harm to the economies of the EU itself and its member states.28 
With Russia being the EU´s largest neighbour and an important trading partner, the 
Ukraine crisis is the most challenging test of the EU`s sanction policy to date, as 
well as its foreign policy at large.29 In contrast to EU´s earlier implementation of 
sanctions, the sanctions against Russia due to the Ukraine crisis were introduced in 
the context of geopolitical as well as ideological rivalry between major regional 
actors, even if the EU never wished to see the crisis in such terms.30  
1.2.2 Selection of countries 
The choice to analyse the V4 Group out of the 28 EU member states has been made 
because of the fact that the Visegrad states usually cooperate in many different 
                                                
24 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 4 
25 Forbrig 2015:1 
26 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 4 
27 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 4-5 
28 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 5 
29 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 3 
30 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 5 
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fields but have taken different stands on the Ukraine conflict.31 The fact that the 
chosen case for this study is highly interesting in itself and not only in the light of 
the V4 countries, a research focus on all the EU´s 28 member states also would 
have been very interesting to carry through. However, the four Visegrad countries 
share geographical proximity to Russia, have a long-standing historical relationship 
and have experienced the Soviet invasion and domination during the Communist 
era.32 The countries common factors and broad field of cooperation makes it 
especially interesting to shed light on the V4 countries when analysing the Ukraine 
conflict, a crisis in which the V4 country´s cohesion problem have become visible. 
The choice to analyse four different countries however implies certain limitations 
such as the fact that the study not will be able to go as deep into the analysis of each 
country as if the research had focused on only one country.  
1.2.3 The Visegrad Group  
The V4 Group is an informal, regional form of cooperation comprising four 
Central-European countries - Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary33 and 
is an intergovernmental setting based on consensual decision-making.34 The V4 
cooperation reflects the efforts of the four countries belonging to the Central 
European region to work together in a number of fields of common interest within 
the all-European integration. The V4 countries have always been part of a single 
civilization sharing cultural and intellectual values and common roots in diverse 
religious traditions, which the countries through the V4 cooperation wanted to 
strengthen further.35 The aim of the V4 cooperation is, among other things, to 
intensify cooperation in the field of building democratic state structures, strengthen 
the stability of Central Europe, to work as a platform for exchanging experiences 
and working out common positions on issues, which are essential to the future of 
the region and the EU.36 In 2004 joined the V4 countries the EU37 and in 1999 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary also joined the NATO, meanwhile 
Slovakia joined NATO in 2004.38  
1.2.4 The Visegrad countries position towards “level 3” sanctions 
The V4 countries have been united towards the Ukraine crisis and have been able to 
keep a joint position on “level 1” and “level 2” sanctions but have remained divided 
                                                
31 Visegradgroup.eu – Aims and Structure, 2000-2015 
32 Belkin, E. Mix, Woehrel, 2014:6 
33 Ministry of foreign affairs Republic of Poland, 2012 
34 Rácz, 2014: 3 
35 Visegradgroup.eu – About Visegrad, 2000-2015 
36 Ministry of foreign affairs Republic of Poland, 2012 
37 Mykulanynets, Lyubov, 2014 
38 Belkin, E. Mix, Woehrel, 2014: 7 
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regarding “level 3” sanctions against Russia.39 On the 20th of March 2014 was an 
article by Judy Dempsey posted at the Carnegie Europe website article mapping out 
the V4 countries positions on `tougher´ sanctions towards Russia. The article 
presented the following result: Poland (supportive), Czech Republic (reluctant but 
will support), Slovakia (reluctant but will support) and Hungary (very reluctant).40 
The article presents two different deviant positions, the position of Poland (taking a 
clear stand for an implementation of `tougher´ sanctions) and the position of 
Hungary (demonstrating a clear stand against an implementation of `tougher´ 
sanctions). 
1.2.5 Time delimitation 
The chosen time delimitation of this research is March 2014 - March 2015, 
analysing the V4 Groups divided position on the EU sanctions against Russia. The 
time period is chosen due to the month in which the Ukraine Crisis escalated until 
on year after the crisis erupted. 
1.3 Outline of the study 
After this first chapter containing both of the introduction, purpose and problem 
definition and a delimitation of the study, follows next in Chapter 2, a background 
to the Ukraine conflict and thereafter a presentation of the research method and 
material, in Chapter 3. In chapter 4 the theories of Putnamn´s two-level game 
theory as well as Tsebelis nested game theory is described followed by the research 
analysis and a table overview of the hypothesis in chapter 5. Finally, chapter 6 
presents a discussion followed by concluding remarks in chapter 7. 
 
 
                                                
39 Rácz, 2014: 6 
40 Dempsey, Judy, 2014 
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2 Background 
The following section provides a brief summary of the Ukraine crisis and highlights 
the EU's implementation of sanctions towards Russia as well as Russia´s 
retaliatory measures and a brief overview of the EU member states attitudes on 
`tougher´ sanctions against Russia. 
2.1 The Ukraine conflict  
The political crisis and social upheaval in Ukraine that led to several weeks of 
protest on the Independence Square in central Kyiv, or so-called Euromaidan, 
started as a gathering of a few thousand students. The protesters demanded that 
Ukraine should sign the Association Agreement with the EU, after that Yanukovych 
sudden did an unexpected U-turn deciding not to sign the Association Agreement 
just before the Vilnius summit of November 28-29, 2013. A signing of the 
Association agreement for Ukraine would have marked a decisive step away from 
the centuries-long orientation toward Russia and the east.41 Yanukovych choice to 
not sign the association agreement gave rise to anti-government protesters 
peacefully occupied the Independece Sqaure in central Kiev. 42 What at first 
appeared as an assembly of students protesting on the Euromaidan, however, 
suddenly bloomed into a full-fledged movement (not only of protest but opposition) 
and resulted in months of protests.43 On the 18 February 2014 the Maidan decided 
to block the parliament building44 which, resulted in an escalation of the violence 
with a policemen being shot and riot police moving in to a clearly peaceful protest 
camp. Approximately 77 people were killed and around 600 people were injured.45 
On 22 February 2014 Yanukovych was forced out and fled the country46 and an 
interim government was installed under acting president Oleksandr Turchynov.47 A 
few days later, on 28 of February, the Russian President Vladimir Putin took 
control of the Ukrainian Crimea with the help of a special forces.48 Since March 
2014 has the EU decided on the adoption and gradual extension of sanctions 
                                                
41 Diuk, Nadia, 2014 
42 Fishwick, Carmen 2014 
43 Diuk, Nadia, 2014 
44 Olszanski, Tadeusz A., 2014 
45 Fishwick, Carmen 2014 
46 Olszanski, Tadeusz A., 2014 
47 Fishwick, Carmen 2014 
48 Kragh, Martin, 2014: 51 
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towards Russia. The EU`s response towards Russia is a reaction to the violation of 
Ukraine`s sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as Russia´s continuing of a 
destabilisation of the country.49 Russian separatists have however continued their 
attacks in eastern Ukraine even after the EU´s implementation of sanctions against 
Russia and the EU accuses Moscow of supporting the Russian separatist attacks. 
Furthermore, after the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 crashed in Eastern Ukraine 
in July 2014 the relations between EU and Russia got even more intense. According 
to Susanne Kraatz (Policy Department A: Economy and Scientific Policy, 
European Parliament), the airplane presumed to have been shot down and the 
Russian government showed on a distinct lack of willingness to cooperate with any 
investigations. The summer 2014 was marked by an increasing escalation of 
violence and according to the UN approximately 3,000 people lost their lives 
between April and October 2014.50 
Russia´s plans to form the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU)51 are furthermore 
important to mention when explaining the Ukraine conflict. These plans became 
officially known in 2011 and featured in Putin's program article "The new 
integration project for Eurasia". According to Putin's article 2011 the Union aims to 
financially link Europe with Asia and the Pacific region in a future Free Trade 
Area.52 The emergence of the ECU could be interpreted as a signalling from Russia, 
stating that the EU is not the ‘only game in town’. This is particularly visible in 
Ukraine, where Russia has been actively promoting the ECU as an alternative to the 
EU integration mechanism, such as the Association Agreement. Russia clearly sees 
ECU as a vehicle for reintegrating the post-Soviet space, including the countries 
that fall within the sphere of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood.53 
2.2 EU sanctions against Russia 
The Ukraine crisis faced the EU with a severe threat to European security and 
resulted in a approach combining diplomacy and sanctions 54 The EU´s goal with 
the sanctions was, according to the European Council, to bring about a change in 
Russia`s action in Ukraine, namely the illegal annexation of territory and the 
deliberate destabilization of a neighbouring sovereign state.55  
In light of Russia's actions, the EU imposed targeted sanctions measures with a 
clear rationale: “political and economic measures were to escalate unless Russia 
reserved its policy towards Ukraine”. The EU imposed three different sanction 
rounds. The first round of EU restrictive measures came into place on 17 March 
                                                
49 Kraatz, Susanne, 2014: 1-2 
50 Kraatz, Susanne, 2014: 1-2 
51 Dragneva, Rilka, Wolczuk, Kataryna, 2012: 2 
52 Johannsson, Johnson, Arumäe, Gaspuitis, Tauraite, 2014-10: 20 
53 Dragneva, Rilka, Wolczuk, Kataryna, 2012: 2 
54 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 3 
55 Raik, Helwig, Jokela, 2014: 3 
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2014 and placed 21 government and private individuals on the sanction list 
(targeted with an assets freeze and a travel ban). On March 21st, another 12 
individuals were added to the sanction list (individuals whom were already in the 
list of subjects for US sanctions). The March 29th the EU added another 15 
individuals to the list, this time 13 Russian politicians and two Ukrainian 
separatists. The second sanction round took place a month later on April 29th 
adding another 15 individuals to the travel ban and assets freeze sanctions lists, 
bringing the total number of targets to 48. On repeated occasions due to the rising 
tensions between Russia and Ukraine the EU decided to expand the sanctions 
further (April 28th, May 12th, June 23rd, July 11th, 18th, 25th). The third round of EU 
sanctions against Russia was imposed on July 29th and significantly accelerated its 
financial warfare. The EU decided to target a variety of sectorial cooperation and 
exchanges with the Russian Federation. The sanctions in round three included 
limited access to EU capital markets for Russian State-owned financial institutions; 
a partial arms embargo on trade in arms; the establishment of an export ban for dual 
use goods meaning goods, software, and technology normally used for civilian 
purpose but which have military functions as well for military end users. The export 
ban for dual goods is restricting Russian access to sensitive technologies 
particularly in the field of the oil sector. The sanctions in round three furthermore 
expanded the list of persons entities undermining Ukrainian territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, including so-called `cronies´; suspension of European Investment 
Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development financing. The 
sanctions also put a restriction of investment and trade with Crimea and Sevastopol 
and imply a reassessment of Russia-EU bilateral cooperation with a view of 
reducing the level of the cooperation.56 
2.3 Russian retaliatory measures 
In response to Western economic sanctions Russia decreed a ban on agricultural 
products and foodstuffs from the EU, US, Norway, Canada and Australia on 7 
August 2014, applicable from August 8,57 valid for one year.58 The list of products 
issued by the Russian government covers the following products: 
 
”Vegetables and fruits: except prepared vegetables and fruits. 
Dairy products: milk, dairy products (notable cheese, skimmed-milk 
powder, butter, whey powder, fresh products, whole-milk powder, 
condensed milk) and some food preparations containing milk 
components. 
                                                
56 Eriksson, Mikael 2014: 120-121 
57 European Commission MEMO/14/517, 2014:1 
58 Kraatz, Susanne, 2014: 3 
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Meat: meat of bovine animals, swine and poultry (weather fresh, 
chilled or frozen), as well as meat salted, in brine, dried or smoked, 
sausages and similar products”.59 
 
In 2014 was over 41 percent of Russia`s consumption of agricultural products 
produced by imports, with average EU and USA levels at around 20 percent. Russia 
received up to 55 percent of its agricultural imports from the countries is has so far 
sanctioned, including the EU. Approximately 50 percent of Russia`s meat imports 
as well as about 95 percent of Russia`s dairy imports in 2013 came from countries 
it has now banned.60 
                                                
59 Kraatz, Susanne, 2014: 3 
60 Erokhin, Heijman, Ivolga, 2014: 57 
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3 Method and Material 
Below follows a presentation of the research design, the choice of material as well 
as a contribution to existing literature. 
3.1.1 Research Design 
The thesis consists of a qualitative case study in which one particular case is at the 
centre of the research. By using existing theories and explanatory factors the 
research will try to explain this particular case61. 
To be able to single out and discuss which explanatory factors that can explain 
the V4 countries divided position on the EU sanctions towards Russia this research 
will use Putnam´s two-level game theory and Tsebelis nested game theory. The 
analysis aims to single out which of five different hypotheses that is of most 
strategic importance to the V4 countries, explaining why the countries cannot find a 
common position on the EU sanctions against Russia. The thesis is not aiming to 
test the theories but instead aims to use Putnam´s two-level game theory and 
Tsebelis theory of nested games as a analytical tool to be able to map out and 
discuss the V4 countries different strategic choices and explain how those are 
intertwined within a nested game connected to the three different arenas: the 
domestic arena, the supranational arena and the international arena. The hypothesis 
will be analysed one by one for each one of the countries which enables the study to 
single out which one of the hypothesis that might be of most strategic importance 
explaining the country’s position. 
3.1.2 Material  
The material in this research mainly consists of research reports, academic articles, 
briefing papers, press releases and newspapers. The materials from electronic 
resources have been selected from well-known and established websites. Due to the 
fact that the chosen case of this research persists of an on-going conflict the 
research material mainly consist of media sources, which have sometimes made it 
difficult to find more detailed information and furthermore made the material 
difficult to construe.  
                                                
61 Esaiasson, 2007: 42 
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3.1.3 Existing literature 
The increased use of sanctions has given rise to an intense scholarly and policy 
debate on weather sanctions work. The scholarly literature delivers a predominately 
negative result of the effectiveness of sanctions in bringing about a desired effect or 
behavioural impact.62 To mentioned some of the important books on sanctions: 
Baldwin (1985: 3) who tries to answer the puzzle, "Why do statesmen continue to 
practice economic statecraft when 'everybody knows' that it does not work?". 
Furthermore, the research of Hufbauer and Schott (1985) indicated that in 83 
incidents involving economic sanctions after 1914, the success rate was a poor 40 
percent.63 However more resent studies on the EU´s sanctions policy have stressed 
the importance of sanctions as a part of the broader foreign policy toolbox and the 
need for a more nuanced understanding of the purpose and contexts of different 
sanctions regimes.64In Leander Leenders research “EU Sanctions: A Relevant 
Foreign Policy Tool?” he examines an instrument, which establishes an explicit link 
between economic power and foreign policy of the EU, investigating to what extent 
sanctions is a relevant tool for EU external action. The research acknowledges the 
many internal and external difficulties the EU faces when using the sanctions tool.65  
3.1.4 Contribution to existing literature 
The results of this research aim to contribute to the understanding of how complex 
the EU is and which factors that come into play in a member country's decision to 
implement sanctions against another countries. The research also intends to point to 
a very unusual and complex crisis situation in Europe in which cooperation 
between the EU member states should perhaps be stronger than it has proven to be. 
However, with the understanding of states rational behaviour in which many 
different factors is taken to account within a states decision a wider understanding 
of the member states decisions can be reached. The research thus contributes to a 
greater understanding for cooperation between the various arenas on a domestic-, 
supranational- and international level and highlights the considerations and factors 
that different states are taking into account in their decision-making. The thesis 
furthermore draws attention to how the Member States' self-interest and rational 
behaviour is an important factor in the explaining and understanding of what could 
be perceived as a states irrational behaviour. The thesis also aims to shed more light 
to the characteristics of the EU-Russia relationship as well as the EU-Ukraine 
relationship with a focus on the V4 countries. 
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4 The two-level game and the three-
level game 
To identify what is behind the Visegrad Groups different positions and lack of unity 
on the EU sanctions this study will construct a game theory perspective. The theory 
spring from Putnam’s two-level game theory and will focus on Tsebelis Nested 
game theory. The two theory´s will together enable to map out the Visegrad 
countries different games nested in an arena dynamics consisting of the three 
different arenas: the domestic arena, the supranational arena and the international 
arena. Below follows a more detailed description of the two theories as well as my 
interpretation of the theories. 
 
4.1 Putnam’s theory of two-level games 
In 1988 adopted Putnam the two-level games theory,66 which later in 1990 was 
developed to a similar approach adopted by Tsebelis Nested Game theory. In 
Putnam´s two-level game theory he argues that the domestic politics and the 
international relations often are entangled highlighting the players challenging 
task of balancing the on going games on two different arenas. The thesis stems from 
Putnam’s famous essay Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of the two-level 
game.  
 
Putnam means that many international negotiations can be perceived as a two-level 
game, one domestic arena game and one foreign policy arena game. At the national 
level the domestic groups try to pursue their interests by pressuring the government 
to adopt favourable policies and at the same time the politicians seek power to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy the domestic interests. What makes the two-
level game rather complex is the fact that the players on both arenas are faced with 
the difficulty of balancing the two on-going games; a “move” which could be 
rational for a player at one particular arena could be irrational or unsuitable for that 
same player on another arena. Central decision-makers can ignore neither of the 
two games as long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.67 
                                                
66 Tsebelis, 1990: 243 
67 Putnam, 1988: 434 
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The theory of two-level games has been selected in this research in order to 
explain to which degree the V4 countries' domestic policy or foreign policy has the 
most influence on the country’s decisions. Putnam´s theory will furthermore be 
used to bring forward a discussion on the interlinked game between the domestic 
arena and the supranational arena to single out how well the V4 countries is 
managing the difficulty in balancing those two on going games.   
4.2 Tsebelis Nested Games theory 
George Tsebelis (1990), professor of political science at the University of 
California, Los Angeles, uses game theory to create a link between domestic and 
foreign policy to explain why political actors choose to act in a certain way, 
arguing that games are nested in multiple arenas. The thesis is based on Tsebelis 
book, Nested Games- rational choice in comparative politics.  
 
The Nested Games Theory assumes that people are rational and maximize their 
goal achievement.68 The core of the theory is built on the idea that seemingly 
suboptimal choices indicate the presence of nested games in multiple arenas. 
Games in multiple arenas refer to that events and strategies in one arena can 
influence the way the game is played in another arena.69 Suboptimal choices appear 
where an actor is confronted with a series of choices and does not pick the 
alternative that appear to be the best or the most rational. Such behaviour could be 
seen to speak against the assumption that actors are rational and seek to make 
choices that will maximize their benefits. However, Tsebelis argues that cases of 
apparently sub-optimal choice70 “are in fact cases of disagreement between the 
perspectives of the actor and the observer.”71 This means that the observer has not 
taken all factors into account or has not realized that the game is nested into a 
network of other games.72 “What appears sub-optimal from the perspective of only 
one game is in fact optimal when the whole network of games is considered.”73 If 
an actor´s choices appear to be suboptimal, it is because the observer`s perspective 
is incomplete and because of the fact that the observer only focus attention on one 
game while the actor is involved in a whole network of games - by Tsebelis called 
nested games: games in multiple arenas.74 Within this rational-choice approach, and 
assuming adequate information, the concept of nested games is the only explanation 
for the choice of apparently suboptimal strategies75.  
                                                
68 Tsebelis, 1990: 235 
69 Ibid, 1990: 248 
70 Ibid, 1990: 7 
71 Ibid, 1990: 7 
72 Ibid, 1990: 7 
73 Ibid, 1990: 7 
74 Ibid, 1990: 7 
75 Tsebelis, 1990: 11 
  14 
In game theory, a game is defined by three factors composed of 1) a set of 
players 2) a set of strategies for each player and 3) a set of payoffs for each player. 
Each player’s payoff is a function of the strategies each player selects. Furthermore, 
the strategies available to each player depend on the moves available to each player, 
on the sequence of these moves (the order in which the players move), and the 
information available before each move.76 The most common game theoretic way 
to deal with problems of games in multiple arenas is to consider all the actors 
involved in all existing arenas, write down all their available strategies, add all the 
possible innovating strategies, and solve this giant game.77 In the case of games in 
multiple arenas, any of the actor´s moves has consequences in all arenas; an optimal 
alternative in one arena (or game) will not necessarily be optimal with respect to the 
entire network of arenas in which the actor is involved. This means that although 
the observer of only one game considers some behaviour irrational or mistaken, the 
behaviour is in fact optimizing inside a more complicated situation, the actors 
maximize by taking into account all variable payoffs from the entire network of 
variable arenas. The actor might choose a suboptimal strategy in one game if this 
strategy happens to maximize his payoff when all arenas are taken to account. The 
situation in other arenas influence the payoffs of the actors in one arena, leading to 
the choice of different strategies; therefore, the outcomes of the game are different 
when the situation in other areas are taken into account.78  
The use of the theory of games in multiple arenas enables the study of situations 
in which political context is important and the situation is so complicated that 
reference to exogenous factors is required.79Game theory furthermore makes it 
possible to model the interaction between different political actors.80 
The choice to bringing the theory of nested games into the research is in order to 
integrate interactions between a variety of arenas and games, it is not enough to 
only analysing the on going game on two different arenas. This forces the two-level 
game framework to be expanded, which therefore has been made by embedding it 
into the broader conception of nested names. The both theories however aim to 
complement each other in order to provide a deeper understanding of the case. The 
theory of nested games will be used in this study adding a third game arena, namely 
the international arena enabling to analyse the V4 countries external relation and 
cooperation with countries outside the EU focusing on Russia and Ukraine. 
4.3 Interpretation of the theories 
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In the light of Putnam´s two level game theory highlighting the players challenging 
task of balancing two on going games on different arenas, and the Tsebelis theory 
of nested games arguing that games are nested in multiple arenas, this research will 
focus on three different arenas when analysing the V4 countries divided position. 
The research will focus on the following three arenas: the domestic arena, the 
supranational arena and the international arena.  
Arena 1 (the domestic level) will explain each one of the V4 countries 
government formations, the government’s political goals and interests, the 
influence from its political leader and the public opinion´s stand on an 
implementation of sanctions towards Russia. 
Arena 2 (the supranational level/the EU level) will explain the V4 countries 
cooperation and actions on the EU level describing how the countries position on 
the sanctions have impacted the V4 countries relationship with the EU. 
Arena 3 (the international level) represents the V4 countries cooperation with 
countries outside the EU with a focus on the V4 countries cooperation with Russia 
and Ukraine. The aim is to investigate if the V4 countries relationship and 
cooperation’s with Russia and Ukraine has affected the country’s position on the 
sanctions.  
The use of both Putnam´s and Tsebelis theory enables the study to map out the 
V4 countries different games nested in an arena dynamics consisting of the three 
different arenas. An analysis of three different arenas also enables to map out an 
even more complex game field since a deal which is considered to be rational in 
one arena not have to be considered rational on another arena.  
4.3.1 Model of the three-level game 
ARENA 1  
(The domestic policy level) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARENA 2  
(The supranational  
policy level) 
 
 
ARENA 3 
(The international 
policy level) 
 
Poland Slovakia The Czech 
Republic Hungary 
The 
European 
Union 
Non-EU 
relations 
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4.3.2 Explanation of the Hypothesis 
Below follows an explanation to the choices of the hypothesis as well a detailed 
description of each one of the hypothesis content.    
 
The choices of the hypothesis steams from the Finnish institute of international 
affairs (FIIA) Briefing Paper 158 (June 2014) in which András Rácz highlights the 
V4 countries individual policies towards Russia as defined by a constellation of 
geopolitical concerns, normative motivations, business interests, and domestic 
political ambitions. Rácz mean that in order to get the full picture of the V4 
countries different reaction to the Ukraine crisis, it is necessary to also explore and 
compare the V4 countries relation to both Ukraine and Russia. Factors as the 
energy dependence and intensity of business contacts are commonly coted to 
explain the different attitudes adopted by EU member states towards Russia. 
However, Rácz argue that these factors do not wholly explain why a unified 
Visegrad position is not emerging and why an individual V4 country chooses this 
or that political position, particularly when it comes to economic sanctions. In the 
Briefing Paper 158 Rácz state an example on why it is not enough to only look at 
explanatory factors such as energy dependence and the intensity of business 
contacts. Rácz argue that e.g. Poland has more intensive business contacts with 
Russia than Slovakia has, and therefore has much more to lose in the event that 
extensive sanctions are introduced. However, it is Slovakia that is strongly opposed 
to the sanctions, particularly economic ones, while Poland supports them.81 
This research has chosen to explain the V4 countries divided position by looking 
into five different hypotheses, each of which will be presented below explaining the 
hypothesis content and motivate the reason for the choice of hypothesis. The five 
hypotheses are seen as interlinked but have been divided into five separate 
hypotheses to enable an analysis of each one of the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 consist of Domestic political ambitions (domestic politics), which 
aim to explain to what extent the V4 countries government formation, political 
leadership and public opinion have influenced the countries position on tougher 
sanctions against Russia. The hypothesis has been chosen in the light of Rácz 
statement above and aim to enable the research to investigate the V4 countries 
domestic politics as a possible explanation to the V4´s position. 
Hypothesis 2 consists of Business interest (trade interests & energy security) 
and will explain to what extent each one of the V4 countries trade with Russia, 
focusing on the country´s export and import with Russia as well as which percent of 
the country´s trade that include band products. The hypothesis will furthermore 
explain the V4 countries degree of energy dependence and energy cooperation with 
Russia and to what extent the V4 countries receive gas from other countries than 
Russia. The hypothesis have been chosen due to the fact that this research 
investigate economic sanctions which makes the country’s trade interests and 
                                                
81 Rácz, 2014: 3 
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energy security particular interesting to investigate due to the sanctions effects on 
the V4 countries economies.  
Hypothesis 3 consists of Geopolitical concerns (military security) and aims to 
explain the country´s security concern and threat perception explaining to what 
degree the V4 countries perceive Russia´s actions in Ukraine as a threat to the 
country´s security. The hypothesis will furthermore explain to extent the countries 
contribute to NATO regarding the Ukraine conflict. The choice of this hypothesis 
has been made due to the fact that the V4 countries are members of NATO and 
therefore presumably would stand united towards threats and contribute to NATO 
when requested from the other NATO members. 
Hypothesis 4 consists of European Union cooperation explaining to what extent 
the V4 countries can be seen to be EU-friendly, living up to the EU's model of 
democracy. The hypothesis will also explain how and if the V4 countries 
cooperation and relation with the EU have changed due to the Ukraine crisis and/or 
due to the countries taken stand on the implementation of tougher sanctions against 
Russia.  
Hypothesis 5 consists of External cooperation with non-EU countries and aims 
to explain the V4 countries cooperation and relation with Russia and Ukraine. The 
hypothesis will map out to what extent the V4 countries relationship with Russia 
and Ukraine has influenced the V4 countries position on the sanctions against 
Russia. The hypothesis have been chosen due to the fact that the V4 countries are 
members of the EU and chosen themselves to be a part of the Union, which speaks 
against a divided stand on the implementation of EU sanctions.  
The hypothesis presented above can be divided into three different groups. The 
first hypothesis, domestic political ambitions, is connected to the first arena (the 
domestic level) and can be seen to be normative based consisting of normative 
issues highlighting the V4 countries differences in their normative stands. The 
second hypothesis, Business interest, as well as the third hypothesis, Geopolitical 
concerns, are both connected to the second arena (the supranational level) and can 
be seen to be interest based, explaining the V4 countries trade interest, energy 
interest and geopolitical concerns. Hypothesis four, European Union cooperation, 
as well as hypothesis five External cooperation with non-EU countries is connected 
to arena three (the international level) and can be seen as more cooperation based 
explaining the V4 countries cooperation with other EU member states and the V4 
countries cooperation with other countries outside the EU. This means that the five 
hypotheses together provide us with normative based-, interest based-, and 
cooperation based explanations to the V4 countries divided positions on the EU 
sanctions against Russia. 
4.3.3 Operationalization 
To be able to explain the V4 countries' divided positions, this research will use five 
different hypotheses, consisting of: (1) Domestic political ambitions, (2) Business 
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interests, (3) Geopolitical concerns, (4) EU cooperation, and (5) The external 
cooperation with non-EU countries. The five hypotheses will function as 
explanatory factors trying to describe what is behind each of the V4 countries taken 
position on the EU sanctions against Russia. What the hypothesis has in common is 
the feature that each hypothesis exists on at least two of the three arenas (the 
domestic arena, the supranational arena and the international arena) and is thereby 
creating an arena dynamics in which the V4 countries nested games becomes 
visible. 
4.3.4 The model of the linkage between arena dynamics and the six 
different hypothesis  
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4.3.5 Theoretical assumptions 
To be able to single out the actor’s rational behaviour I find it important to draw 
certain assumptions. As earlier mentioned the research steams from the rational-
choice approach, which assumes that individual´s behaviour is an optimal response 
to the conditions of her environment and to the behaviour of other actors.82 
Furthermore, the rational-choice approach assumes that people are rational, 
meaning that they are goal oriented and choose the optimal means to achieve their 
goals.83 Below I present the assumptions of rationality important for this particular 
research. 
Assumption 1 - Assume that the actors do not have contradictory approaches and 
preferences. A player with contradictory strategies and thereby preferences would 
not be able to choose between two different alternatives84  
Assumption 2 – Assume transitivity between preferences prevail. Meaning that 
if an actor prefers alternative a over alternative b, and alternative b over c, she 
necessarily prefers a over c85. These two assumptions assure us that the actor´s have 
the capacity to maximize their outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
82 Tsebelis 1990: 46 
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84 Ibid 1990: 25 
85 Ibid 1990: 25 
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5 The explanation to the Visegrad 
countries positions  
5.1 Domestic political ambitions 
Hypothesis 1 consist of Domestic political ambitions (domestic politics), which aim 
to explain to what extent the V4 countries government formation, political 
leadership and public opinion have influenced the countries position on tougher 
sanctions against Russia.  
5.1.1 Poland 
According to the Finnish institute of international affairs briefing paper published 
in June 2014, is Poland ready to support an implementation of “level 3” sanctions, 
if necessary, despite the considerable economic losses at stake meanwhile the other 
three V4 countries are against “level 3” sanctions, arguing that the sanctions would 
cut of the countries economic ties with Russia and furthermore have a significant 
impact on the countries own economies.86 
Poland has condemned Russia`s invasion and annexation of Crimea but has tried 
to avoid turning the issue into a “bilateral spat” with Russia.87 Poland has navigated 
a position towards a fine line between active support for Ukraine and supporting 
Western unity. The position Poland has taken also stems from the assessment of the 
country´s economic, social and military potential which has been estimated as 
inadequate for standing up to the deteriorating security environment.88 The Polish 
analysis of the Ukraine crisis is not that this is a passing crisis, but instead a 
permanent change in Russia´s foreign policy aiming to rebuilding Russia´s sphere 
of influence in Eastern Europe, causing implications for the whole continent. 
Poland is an outspoken supporter of Ukraine’s integration with the EU and 
therefore felt a responsibility to take a stance in the Ukraine crisis.89 Poland called 
for a tough EU stance in terms of Russian sanctions and for a common energy 
policy reducing energy dependence on Russia.90 Poland is clearly the country 
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adopting the toughest position on Russia out of the V4 Group and actively supports 
the sanctions, including economic ones, participating in the NATO mission to 
strengthen the air defence of the Baltic States, and demanding the deployment of 
US troops.91 András Rácz (Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish institute of 
international affairs - The EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia Research 
Programme) state that even though its important to not forget that Poland have 
essential and intensive trade relations with Russia, the geo(political) ambitions of 
Poland seemingly override the economic considerations, including energy and 
security ones. 92  Regarding Poland’s normative stand, Poland traditionally 
demonstrates a very strong trans-Atlantic commitment.93  
Poland is since 2007 ruled by a reform-minded coalition consisting of Donald 
Tusks´94 centralist/liberal Civic Platform (PO) and the rural Polish People`s Party 
(PSL). Main opposition parties are the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS), 
the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the left-liberal Palikot’s Movement.95 The 
Polish government has taken an active diplomatic role in the crisis over 
neighbouring Ukraine, calling for a united response from the European Union to 
Russia's actions in Crimea. 96  Under the current Polish government, the 
centralist/liberal Civic Platform (PO), Poland´s complex ties with Russia improved 
and Russia´s annexation of Crimea has revived ancient fears in Poland.97 Poland´s 
efforts to find a resolution to the Ukraine crisis have been a key issue for the public 
opinion in the country. According to a survey made by the German Marshall Fund`s 
Transatlantic Trends, 78 percent of Poles supported economic aid to Ukraine, 77 
percent supported sanctions against Russia, and 67 percent supported helping 
Ukraine even if it could include the risk of conflict with Russia.98  
Poland’s outspoken support for Ukraine´s integration in the EU as well as the 
Polish public´s opinion demonstrating a strong EU line and willingness to help 
Ukraine (even if it could include risking a conflict with Russia), which indicate that 
the polish domestic ambitions are willing to pay a high price to make Russia pay 
for their actions. The strong Polish public support for the EU sanctions against 
Russia as well as the fact that Poland managed to take an active diplomatic role in 
the EU indicated that Poland has been able to keep a balance between the domestic 
and supranational game-arena. Furthermore, Poland also has managed to keep a 
fine line between active support for Ukraine and supporting Western unity, which 
indicates that Poland at the same time also have managed to keep balance between 
its support to Ukraine and a support of the Western unity. The findings above 
clearly state that Poland’s energetic political domestic ambitions to take an active 
diplomatic role and its outspoken strong support for the EU can explain Poland´s 
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taken position in the sanction war. The hypothesis domestic political ambitions can 
therefore be adopted as one possible explanation. 
5.1.2 The Czech Republic 
The public opinion in the Czech Republic and foreign policy elite is deeply cleaved 
regarding the Ukraine conflict and the political mainstream has been divided into 
two camps with different positions on the crisis. One camp consists of the 
multilateralists, stressing the need for a unified EU approach and the other camp 
consist of the pragmatists, who are stressing economic interests. The Czech 
government is very cautious in it´s positioning on Russia and the Ukraine crisis, 
and a trend towards more unity on the issue is highly unlikely.99 However, the 
Czech Republic is in favour of and contribution to a strengthening NATO in the 
Baltic region and has cancelled the Rosatom-led Temelín nuclear power project100 
(a project adding two reactors to the existing two at Temelín). The explanation for 
cancelling the project may have been the fact that the Ukraine crisis trigged many 
Czech politicians speaking out in opposition to allowing any Russian firm access to 
such an important project and in the end however, it was domestic subterfuge that 
may have been the project's eventual undoing.101 The cancelling of the nuclear 
project seems also to have been made because of the low wholesale power prices 
and Russia´s refusal to provide price guarantees.102 The Czech Republic´s choice to 
contribute to a strengthening NATO and to cancel the Temelín project is actions 
that points towards an altogether higher level of commitment to a stronger Western 
reaction to Russian policies unlike either Slovakia or Hungary.103 The Czech public 
opinion is divided on the sanctions, although 41 percent agree with the country’s 
imposition, 39 percent are against. The supportive group of the public is more 
pronounced on the right, while the public on the left side of the political scale 
dominates a negative view towards the sanctions.104  
The Czech Republic´s foreign policy very much depends on which parties are 
currently in power. Generally, however, one could conclude that the Communists 
are more PRO-Russian, the Socialists more ambivalent and the centre-right rather 
more pro-NATO.105 Since 2014 the government coalition in the Czech Republic is 
headed by the Social Democrat leader Bohuslav Sobotka106 and consist of three 
different parties: the Social Democrats (CSSD), the billionaire Andrej Babis’ party 
“Action for Dissatisfied Citizens” (ANO), and the right-wing conservative 
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Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL). 107  The coalition government in the Czech 
Republic is split over the issue regarding the EU sanctions against Russia and the 
Socialists have reserved the right to oppose any new forthcoming sanctions due to 
economic costs. The more center-right coalition partner, the party “Action for 
Dissatisfied Citizens” (ANO), agrees with the Social Democrats position, while the 
other coalition partner, the right-wing conservative Christian Democrats (KDU-
CSL), is in favour of stronger and more effective sanctions against Russia.108  
The Czech Republic had traditionally a robust approach to defending human 
rights, however this approach is not widely shared by the Czech population. The 
disparity among the public explains the results of the country´s first direct 
presidential election in January 2013. The former minister Karel Schwarzenberg 
who was the living symbol of the Czech human rights policy, was defeated by the 
populist Miloš Zeman, who instead is very sympathetic towards the Russian and 
Chinese regimes.109 The Czech Republic´s foreign policy has during a long time of 
period been characterized by a lasting focus on human rights, which often have put 
the Czech Republic in a very Russia-critical position.110 The current cabinet of 
Bohuslav Sobotka in Czech Republic has however modified the traditional Czech 
policy established a new doctrine of supporting rights based on the promotion of all 
three generations of human rights. However, the promotion of “three generation” of 
human rights, meaning primarily social and economic rights, promoting an 
acceptance of policies of non-democratic states, such as Russia and China. During 
the Ukraine crisis this modification became visible when both Sobotka and the left-
wing president Milos Zeman avoided a clear support of Ukraine. The Czech 
Republic did however not recognize the annexation of Crimea but Zeman and 
Sobotka have strongly criticised the EU sanctions against Russia.111 
The Czech Republic´s domestic political ambitions are contradictory. On the 
one hand, the Czech republic demonstrates deeply cleavages on the issue both 
within the public and the elite and has taken a rather cautious position. On the other 
hand, have the Czech Republic shown on small steps towards a higher level of 
commitment to a stronger Western reaction. The hypothesis, domestic political 
ambition, cannot be seen to be crucial for the explanation of the Czech position on 
the sanction war. 
5.1.3 Slovakia 
Both Slovakia and Hungary are clearly against the EU´s implementation of “level 
3” sanctions and furthermore generally cautious about taking a too tough stance on 
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Russia.112 Slovakia’s and Hungary´s stance in the conflict can be described as a 
clear and safe choice with the aim to score point with Russia in exchange for not 
supporting the sanctions and at the same time safeguarding their political and 
economic relations with Russia.113 Slovakia has questioned the rationale of the 
sanctions that the EU imposed on Russia114 and is furthermore, regarding normative 
issues, much more pragmatic about Russia and pay less attention to normative 
issues than Poland and the Czech Republic do, also when it comes to the 
democracy and human rights situation in Russia.115  
The Slovak ruling party Smer-SD (`Direction - Social Democracy´) is a 
relatively new Slovak116 center-left party117 who wan the parliamentary election in 
2006. The party leader, Robert Fico, is the current prime minister of Slovakia.118 
The ruling Smer-SD party tries to combine two contradictory policy lines towards 
the Ukraine crisis. On the one hand, it supports Ukraine´s European integration 
process; but at the same time the Smer-SD party opposes EU sanctions against 
Russia. The Smer-SD party´s unclear position on the Ukraine crisis as well as its 
diffuse position on Russia´s annexation of Crimea and the support it provides to 
separatists in Donbass, have been criticized from leaders of the parliamentary 
opposition.119 Fico have been criticised for having an unusual spot for non-
democratic regimes 120  and Fico continues to be one of the most outspoken 
European leaders pushing for peace talks between the Ukraine government and pro-
Russia separatist in the east.121 On the EU summit in May 2014 that acknowledged 
preparatory work on targeted measures against Russia, Fico stated that tougher 
sanctions would be `suicidal´ and `nonsensical´. Fico has furthermore rejected an 
increase of Slovakia`s defence spending and to meet the country´s commitments 
under NATO membership, especially due to Russia´s military aggression against 
Ukraine.122  
NGOs and think-tanks have contributed to the public debate on the Ukraine 
crisis by calling on the government to meet NATO and EU membership 
commitments, to support the European integration of Ukraine, and to assist Ukraine 
facing Russia´s aggression and implementing reforms. 123  Fico have favoured 
pragmatic zero-conflict relations with Russia over closer ties with the EU of 
Eastern Partnership countries”.124  Prime Minister Fico`s anti-sanctions rhetoric is 
however not the only official view of the Ukraine crisis. Ivan Gašparovič, the 
                                                
112 Rácz, 2014: 3 
113 Ibid, 2014: 7 
114 Forbrig, 2015: 22 
115 Rácz, 2014: 5 
116 EurActiv, 2009 
117 Forbrig, 2015: 43 
118 EurActiv, 2009 
119 Forbrig, 2015: 43 
120 Koltuniak, Lukasz, 2014 
121 Emerging Europé Monitor Central Europé & Baltics, 2015:8 
122 Forbrig, 2015: 43 
123 Forbrig, 2015: 45 
124 Ibid, 2015:44 
  25 
Slovak Prime Minister until June 2014, elected with support of Fico´s Smer-SD 
party, was the first to publicly declare that the EU should respond towards Russia´s 
action in Ukraine by offering Ukraine a clear EU membership.125 In Slovakia there 
is a division among the public on how to react on the Ukraine crisis.126 “According 
one poll, 45 percent of the citizens agree that Slovakia should support the European 
Integration of Ukraine, while 49 percent say the EU should not punish Russia.”127  
According to the Polish institute of international affairs, the belief of Slovakia in 
the primacy on not distancing Russia is built not only on Slovakia´s energy 
dependence on Russia, or on Fico´s personal beliefs, but also on domestic 
calculations. In the Slovak presidential election in 2014 the intensity of Fico´s 
criticism rise in which he lost the election to the independent candidate Andrej 
Kiska. Taking the approaching of the parliamentary election into account, which 
takes place in spring 2016, and Kiska´s pro-Ukrainian stance, a more diversified 
position would be of benefit for Fico if he is to distinguish himself from the popular 
president and mobilise his own electorate. According to 2014 research, the majority 
of Slovaks, 84 % think that the future of Ukraine should be decided without 
Russian influence, meanwhile more than half judge that the implementation of 
sanctions are a mistake. The research furthermore presents that there is a division 
on the role of Slovakia: 55 % see Slovakia as an active supporter of reforms in its 
eastern neighbourhood, while around 30 % are unequivocally against.128 
The hypothesis, domestic political ambitions, can explain Slovakia´s stand 
against an implementation of EU sanctions due to Prime Minister Fico´s anti-
sanctions rhetoric, rejecting of an increase of Slovakia`s defence spending as well 
as to live up to the country´s commitments under the NATO membership. Fico 
seems to have a great influence on the domestic level and his political leadership 
seems to have played a crucial role in the position taken on the sanction war. As 
stated above Fico´s close ties to Russia can be explained by Slovakia´s energy 
dependence, Fico´s personal beliefs as well as domestic calculations regarding the 
upcoming election – this indicate that a country have many underlying factors to its 
chosen political position. Fico´s political leadership keeping a pro-Russian rhetoric 
can from a nested game theory perspective be seen as rational move from Fico, 
both in mobilising his own electorate in the parliamentary election 2016 and at the 
same time safeguarding Slovakia´s energy source by keep up a good Slovak-
Russian relationship. 
5.1.4 Hungary 
Hungary has since Victor Orbán´s national conservative Fidesz party came to 
power in 2010 become increasingly tilted towards Russia. The government led by 
the Fidesz party enjoys strong popular support domestically and has due to it´s 
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domination of the political agenda since the party´s election victory in 2010 
managed to shift the direction of public political discourse in Hungary. The main 
opposition, the centre-left Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), who ruled the country 
during the communist era perceived mismanagement of the economy, enabled the 
extreme-right Jobbik party to make significant inroads in Hungarian politics. Jobbik 
gained 23 seats out of 199 in the National Assembly in the April 2014 general 
election and have used the influence to shift the dynamic of Hungarian politics 
from a struggle between left and right to one between the right and the extreme 
right.129 Orbán has criticized the sanctions himself stating that the Europe has `shot 
itself in foot´ and stated that the sanctions should be reconsidered. 130  The 
Hungarian government has at each step challenged the EU sanctions effectiveness 
and rationale of the EU sanctions against Russia and is trying to weaken the 
importance of the embargo on Russian goods. For the Hungarian government it is 
of highest importance to avoid sanctions that prohibit EU companies from taking 
out loans in Russian banks, which could mean that Hungary´s project of the 
extension of the Paks nuclear power plant (the largest investment in Hungary made 
after 1989) would be frozen.131  
One reason to why Orbán has taken a more pro-Russian stand is related to 
ideology. Orbán recently stated that the model of “Western” democracy is not any 
longer efficient and has instead pointed out Russia, Turkey and China as economic 
and political success.132 The Hungarian government is being increasingly ostracized 
at the international level as a result of Orbán and his populist Fidesz Party´s alleged 
undermining of civil liberties, increasingly discriminatory policies towards Roma 
and immigrants as well as statements that appear to signal a shift in government 
policy away from liberal democratic values.133 The Hungarian public has unlike 
Orbán been quite divided over the crisis in Ukraine. The public has generally 
showed a very little interest in foreign policy and the debate has been limited to a 
small group of intellectuals and media. There was no major public debate on the 
Ukraine crisis and the debate held had little or no impact on the government. After 
the crisis eruption however a strong part of the Hungarian political elite came out 
directly or indirectly in support of Russia, justifying Russia`s annexation of Crimea 
on the grounds of history and defending the Russian “minority”.134 
The hypothesis, domestic political ambitions, can explain the Hungarian stand 
against the sanctions. Orbán´s leadership has shown to be a crucial factor in the 
explanation of Hungary´s position against tougher sanctions and the importance of 
avoiding sanctions seems to be connected to energy security and the Russian 
investment in Hungary´s nuclear power plants. This indicate that energy security 
have a top priority in Hungary. Orbán uses a very outspoken strategy taking a 
clearly pro-Russian stand, however as mentioned above the Hungarian policy is not 
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received with open arms in the EU which indicate that Orbán´s strong domestic 
policy makes it very difficult to keep a balance between its different on-going 
games. Orbán seems to manage a popular stance on the domestic level and have 
managed to keep its close ties to Russia, however Hungary is also a member of the 
EU and its influence on this level seems to decrease by its shift in government 
policy away from liberal democratic values, undermining of civil liberties and 
discriminatory policies towards Roma, which on the one hand makes it more 
difficult for Hungary to keep a balance between its domestic-, supranational- and 
international game arena.  
5.2 Business interests  
Hypothesis 2 consists of Business interest (trade interests & energy security) and 
will explain the Visegrad countries degree of energy dependence and energy 
cooperation with Russia and to what extent the Visegrad countries receive gas from 
other countries than Russia. The hypothesis will also explain to what extent each 
one of the Visegrad countries trade with Russia, focusing on the country´s export 
and import with Russia as well as which percent of the country´s trade that include 
band products. 
 
Concerning Visegrad energy security, it is important to be aware of the 
fundamentally different situations of the four countries. All four Visegrad countries 
have different energy mixes, however all of them are highly dependent on Russian 
natural gas supplies, and are slightly less dependent on Russian oil.135 The issue 
Europe stands in front of regarding energy security is the minimizing of individual 
European nations´ vulnerability to energy cut-offs by multiplying grids and 
pipelines within the EU and thereby diversifying its energy sources outside the 
Union.136 Of the Visegrad countries is the Czech Republic the country least 
dependent on Russian gas while Slovakia is the most dependent. It is however 
important to highlight some differences in the Visegrad country´s degree of 
dependence on Russian gas supplies.137 Besides the Visegrad countries dependence 
on Russia as a source country is the Visegrad region also dependent on two 
countries of Russian gas, namely Ukraine and Belarus.138 Poland and Slovakia are 
key transit countries for Russian gas flowing westwards, and the Czech Republic 
also plays a transit role. Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are consequently 
protected by their transit positions, meaning that Russia cannot turn off the gas 
supplies of these country´s without endangering its other Western clients.139 It 
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should furthermore be added that Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic also 
already have renewed their long-term gas delivery contracts with Gazprom.140  
5.2.1 Poland 
Poland is highly dependent on Russian gas (accounting for 70 percent of domestic 
consumption) and oil (almost 100 percent), according to Europe Policy Paper 
1/2015 ”A region disunited”.141 However, even if Poland is starting to become 
much better at looking after its energy needs. Poland´s state-controlled natural gas 
company, called PGNiG, has a long-term supply contract with Russia´s gas 
monopoly, Gazprom. Poland have been able to import significantly more gas from 
Germany (thanks to the expansion of a pump station at Mallnow on the border), 
which for the first time means that gas in the Yamal pipeline can be pumped from 
west to east. This does however not mean that Poland can simply stop importing 
gas from Russia but having alternative gas sources means that PGNiG now is in a 
better negotiate position with Gazprom when the next negotiation round of the price 
for gas imports starts in November 2014.142 Poland is also keen on using coal as 
one way to improve its security energy, however this goes against Germany´s green 
ideals. Poland has the Europe´s largest coal reserves and produces 90 percent of its 
electricity from hard coal and lignite. Lignite or brown coal still today remains as 
the cheapest way to produce power in Europe but as well known is it also the most 
polluting energy source.143 Poland is today also already paying a high price to 
achieve some energy independence from Russia through the buying of liquefied 
natural gas from Qatar, which is way more expensive than Russian pipeline gas.144  
The hypothesis business interests showed that Poland is willing to pay a high 
price to implement economic sanctions towards Russia, even if Poland received a 
great trade loss in its agricultural sector and is highly dependent on Russian gas and 
oil. 
Regarding the trade sector is Poland the country worst hit of the sanctions 
among the Visegrad countries, over 73 percent of Poland’s agricultural exports to 
Russia (approximately over 803 mln Euro), are turned out to be banned.145 The 
Czech Republic and Slovakia´s damages are expected to be much lower, about one 
third of the total agricultural exports to Russia, are predicted to be banned.146 
Hungary´s losses are also expected to be far lower than Poland´s, 111 mln Euro, or 
50 percent of the total agricultural exports to Russia. Poland is therefore the 
country, which have the most to lose in the event that responds to EU sanctions 
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with economic counter-measures.147 The share of agricultural exports, banned by 
Russia, in overall agricultural exports from the Visegrad countries to the world are 
very small. Of the four Visegrad countries Poland seems to be the only country that 
experienced a sensible cutback of its agricultural exports in 2014 due to Russia´s 
trade sanctions. 148 Poland’s political stances against Russia, however, come at a 
price. Closed borders have left Poland with around 677,000 tonnes of apples with 
no obvious alternative market for Poland to sell the fruit to. The problem is that 
while some EU countries do not trade with Russia in great quantities, Poland ´s 
apple producers export 56 per cent of their production, looking at a loss of EUR 
500 million (of which only a small share will be reimbursed by the EU).149 In 2013 
the Polish food exports to Russia amounted to €1 billion. 3,000 Polish transport 
companies who are responsible for 20 percent of EU deliveries to Russia are 
estimated to suffer approximately €100 million in losses per month.150  
Even if Poland is the country having essential and intensive trade relations with 
Russia and is hardest hit by the EU sanction out of the Visgrad countries, Poland 
have chosen to take the toughest stance against Russia out of the four country´s. 
Again, Poland demonstrates its willingness to pay a high price (risking economical 
damage) in exchange for putting pressure on Russia, which means that the 
hypothesis Trade interest therefore not can explain the position taken by Poland. 
5.2.2 The Czech Republic 
 
Due to the European Policy Paper 1/2015 “A Region disunited”, Russia constitutes 
the Czech Republics most important partner among the post-Soviet countries 
(however Russia´s overall share of foreign trade is relatively small), accounting for 
only 4.5 percent of the Czech Republic’s foreign trade, with Ukraine being 
substantially less relevant (0.9 percent). The EU member states account for 73.6 
percent of the Czech Republic´s foreign trade and out of the EU countries is 
Germany the most important trading partner with 28.6 percent, followed by 
Slovakia (7.3 percent) and Poland (6.7 percent). This means that the Czech 
economic dependence on trade with Russia is relatively small, the major share of 
imports from Russia consist instead of energy resources. The Russian counter 
sanctions can therefore not have a strong effect on the Czech national economy.151 
The only major Russian bank, Russia’s Sberbank, holds only a 1.9 percent market 
share in the Czech Republic, indicating that Russia is not a top country to have 
foreign direct investment in the Czech Republic.152  
                                                
147 Rácz, 2014: 6 
148 Erokhin, Heijman, Ivolga, 2014: 55-56 
149 Markovic, 2014 
150 Forbrig, 2015: 37 
151 Forbrig 2015: 13 
152 Stratfor Global intellegence, 2015 
  30 
The Czech Republic is the country least dependent on Russian gas, account for 
66 percent of the country´s gas import.153 The sanction war between EU and Russia 
do not have as strong effect on the national economy, on the other hand the Czech 
Republics energy dependence on Russia increase public concerns, even if the Czech 
Republic not is fully dependent on Russian energy resources, unlike some of its 
neighbours.154 Because of the IKL pipeline (Ingolstadt-Kralupy-Litvínov pipeline) 
implemented 1990-1995 mainly for political and economic reasons,155 carrying oil 
imports via Germany, the Czech Republic is neither dependent on Russia in terms 
of oil and nor is the country fully dependent on Russian gas because of the long-
term contract on delivery of gas from Norway.156 Vaclav Klaus (former Czech 
President) and Milos Zeman (current President) have built strong ties to Russian 
energy giant LUKoil. The head of the Czech division of LUKoil played a key role 
in organizing and financing Zeman´s campaign for the Presidency in 2013. Even if 
the LUKoil sold its network of natural gas stations in the Czech Republic to 
Hungary´s MOLGroup in August 2014, the ties between segments of the Czech 
leadership and Russia still withstand.157 
Because of the IKL pipline and the Czech long-term contract on delivery of gas 
from Norway is the Czech Republic not fully dependent on Russian energy. The 
Czech Republic have taken a stand against an implementation of tough sanctions 
against Russia and due to the fact that the country not is fully dependent on Russian 
gas but however have strong ties to the Russian energy giant LUKoil, can the 
hypothesis energy security to some extent explain the Czech position. Regarding 
the Czech trade interests can neither this hypothesis explain the Czech position 
because the fact that the Czech Republic no trade with Russia to a large extend. 
5.2.3 Slovakia 
Russia is a key player in energy in Central Europe, but Slovakia is nearly fully 
dependent on Russian gas, oil and nuclear fuel, which is unique and distinguish 
Slovakia from the other V4 countries. 158  Slovakia (together with the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Ukraine and Bulgaria) relies nearly entirely on Russian state-
owned companies to fuel their nuclear power plants. For 80 million Europeans, the 
Russian state provides services essential to approximately 42 percent of electricity 
production. Slovakia is the country with the greatest Russian cooperation and 
highest dependence on Russian nuclear power, receiving approximately 50 percent 
of its electricity from nuclear generation. In comparison, Ukraine also receives a 
high percent, around 50 percent, Hungary generates 46 percent of its electricity 
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through nuclear, the Czech Republic one-third and Bulgaria 35 percent.159 Slovakia 
also relies on Russia for other nuclear services, such as designing or building new 
power plant and have committed to a budget increase to complete the Mochovce 
nuclear plant, with two Russian reactors. Slovakia´s investments in new Russian 
reactors, is likely to increase its future dependence on Russia.160 As mentioned 
earlier Slovakia also is highly dependent on Russian gas imports, accounting for 93 
percent.161 Slovakia has furthermore also been involved in the South Stream 
project162 (project aiming to strengthening the European energy security).163   
The Europe Policy Paper 1/2015 - A region Disunited? Central European 
Responses to the Russia-Ukraine crisis state that it is very unlikely that Fico´s 
government will spoil the common EU policy. “/../As a left-of-centre pragmatist, 
Fico will never favour trade with Russia (4 percent of Slovak foreign trade in 2013) 
at the expense of trade with EU member state, which accounts for 85 percent of the 
country´s foreign trade. In other words, whatever he says about the crisis, it is very 
unlikely that under his government Slovakia will spoil the common EU policy”.164 
Slovakia´s main trading partners in the region is Russia (bilateral trade reached €8.7 
billion in 2013), followed by Ukraine (reaching €11 billion in 2013) and Belarus 
(reaching €100 million in 2013), meanwhile other Eastern neighbours hardly 
figure.165 
The hypothesis energy security plays a crucial role in explaining the Slovak 
position. The fact that Slovakia is nearly fully dependent on Russian gas, oil and 
nuclear fuel can explain why Russia find it rational for Slovakia to maintain its 
close ties to Russia. Due to Slovakia´s dependence on EU trade one could however 
argue that Slovakia´s choice to take a position against the EU sanctions is rather 
suboptimal according to that Slovakia dependence on EU trade. However, the 
nested game theory state that choices that appear to be suboptimal is only percept 
suboptimal because the observer not have taken the other on-going games into 
consideration. Meaning that by looking into the other hypothesis in the research our 
understanding for Slovakia´s rational strategies will appear clearer. 
5.2.4 Hungary 
Export-driven Hungary is heavily reliant on energy imports from Russia. Russia is 
Hungary´s most important trading partner outside the EU and is also the country´s 
main supplier of gas and oil. Hungary´s dependence on Russia has placed Hungary 
in a vulnerable position in times of a strained political relation between Russia and 
Europe. According to Horváthy Balázs and Adrienn Nyircsák at the Hungarian 
                                                
159 Sparks, Kathryn, 2014 
160 Ibid 
161 Rácz, 2014: 5 
162 Ibid, 2014: 6 
163 EurActiv – Gazprom, 2015 
164 Forbrig, 2015: 46 
165 Ibid, 2015: 45 
  32 
Academy of Sciences (MTA) is the Hungarian government however determined to 
protect its economic interests even if this means overriding broader political goals 
of punitive diplomacy.166  
Hungary is heavily dependent on Russia for its natural gas supplies and Russian 
financial support.167 Hungary has a third level of gas dependency meaning the 
country lacks any significant transit position. Regarding the natural gas sector, the 
situation could well be described as a “triple dependency”: Hungary has only one 
import source (Russia), one transit line (Ukraine) and owns no transit position.168 
Critics is often raised to Orbán concerning that Russia’s investment in Hungarian 
energy (nuclear, in particular) could create a Hungarian dependence on Russia, and 
to tell from Hungary´s newly received Russian support, this dependency may 
already be a reality. One explanation to Hungary´s stand against an implementation 
of tougher EU sanctions against Russia is due to Russia´s deep investment in 
Hungary.169 In early 2015 Hungary agreed on a deal with Russia´s state nuclear 
company for the upgrade of a Hungarian nuclear power plant in Paks, financed by a 
10€ billion loan from Russia. 170  Hungary is planning on reducing it´s gas 
dependence in general by modernizing its existing nuclear power.171 Due to an 
agreement made between Russia and Hungary on January 2014 will Russia both 
build two additional power-generating units and supply higher-enriched fuel. 
However, none of these deals will reduce the Hungarian energy dependence on 
Russia.172  
Orbán´s government is trying to find the best possibly way to overcome a 
serious economic crisis, which have undermined Hungary economy over the last 
ten years. Hungary, therefore seeks to broaden its economic cooperation and 
develop good relations with e.g. China and other non-European states. However, 
Russia is the country, which seems to have a very special place in Hungary´s 
economical recovery process.173 In the re-election of Prime Minister Orbàn in April 
2014 the government-managed cut in household costs and especially in gas and 
heating costs, which attracted many voters and played a crucial role in the re-
election of Orbán. This means that Orbán now cannot afford any increase in gas 
prices, as the political cost would be far to high.174  
The hypothesis energy security can explain Hungary´s taken position against 
tougher sanctions against Russia, due to Hungary´s dependence on Russian gas 
import and Hungary´s 10€ billion loan from Russia modernizing it´s nuclear power 
plant in Paks. Furthermore, Hungary’s involvements in the South Stream project 
indicate Hungary´s willingness to continue to broaden its economic cooperation and 
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dependency on Russia. A crucial explanation seems furthermore to be that Orbán 
due to otherwise to high political costs not can afford any increase in gas prices. 
 
5.3 Geopolitical concerns  
Hypothesis 3 consists of Geopolitical concerns (military security) and aims to 
explain the country´s security concern and threat perception explaining to what 
degree the Visegrad countries perceive Russia´s actions in Ukraine as a threat to 
the country´s security. The hypothesis will furthermore explain to extent the 
countries contribute to NATO regarding the Ukraine conflict. 
 
Looking into the NATO´s reaction to the Ukraine Crisis three main issues the 
Visegrad countries (and Germany) revolved around can be singled out. ”1) 
Permanent NATO bases request (threat perception), 2) strengthening of NATO´s 
eastern flank (rhetoric discourse reassurance vs. deterrence), and 3) arms deliveries 
to Ukraine (conflict escalation vs. Raising costs for Russian aggression)”.175 
Considering the request for new NATO bases the Visegrad countries have different 
national positions. Poland and other Eastern NATO member states raised their 
voice quite early after the conflict outbreak stating that the annexation of Crimea 
means a direct threat to their national security and requested permanent NATO 
bases to enhance their security. The Czech and Slovak government instead 
expressed the view that the recent Russian aggression did not constitute a direct 
threat to their countries meaning that no bases are necessary. Meanwhile the 
Hungarian government maintained, “radio silence” on the issue, however Orbán 
later made a statement demanding autonomy for Hungarians living in Ukrainian 
Zakarpattya. The NATO summit in September 2014 produced a workable 
compromise that accommodated the interests of both sides resulting in the factual 
strengthening of the NATO´s eastern flank.176  
The second issue consist of the fact that the rhetoric of the government officials 
hinted that the V4 countries different threat perception did not subside. The Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary followed the old German foreign policy principle 
of `non-provocation´ towards Russia on NATO´s eastern flank, moving closer 
towards the Germany´s position. In terms of security policy have these three V4 
country´s clearly moved away from Poland and other eastern countries.177  
The third issue is the V4 countries divergence in security policies of Central 
European countries, which became more visible because of the Ukraine crisis and 
consisted of the possible delivery of arms to Ukraine.178 Whereas Poland find arms 
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deliveries as a possible tool, Germany plus the other V4 countries (the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) opposes the arms deliveries as such and argue 
that this step would only lead to the escalation of the conflict in the eastern 
Ukraine.179  
5.3.1 Poland 
 
Poland stresses the importance of the EU maintaining a common line on the 
Ukraine crisis focusing on raising the costs of Russia´s aggression through 
economic means, not through military means.180 As mentioned above, Poland is 
however ready to contribute military to strengthening NATO´s Eastern European 
defence capabilities and is demanding the deployment of US troops to the country; 
as of 1 May Poland is leading the NATO mission aimed at enhancing the air 
defence of the Baltic States. Poland is also contributing with four MiG-29 fighters 
and is hosting other NATO air force units. Either Slovakia or Hungary has made 
such commitments.181 Poland`s NATO and EU membership as well as Poland’s 
bilateral alliance with the United States are the country`s primary security 
guarantees. Poland has launched a major program of military modernization in 
parallel to acting through NATO and the EU, with a budget of $40 billion over the 
coming decade, and furthermore increased its annual spending for defence to 2 
percent of GDP.182 Poland has furthermore also offered (along with the United 
Kingdom) military training for Ukrainian armed forces, however this training will 
take place in Poland and not in Ukraine.183 Regarding the Polish public view on the 
Ukraine crisis, 78 percent of the Poles believe that Ukraine crisis poses a threat to 
their country security, and 69 per cent of the Poles think that imposing `tougher´ 
economy sanctions on Russia is the right way to act. While Poland sees the Russian 
threat behind the Ukraine crisis the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary do not 
share the Polish public´s worry that Russia poses a threat behind the crisis.184 
The hypothesis, geopolitical concern, can explain Poland´s taken stand for 
tougher sanctions against Russia because of the fact that Poland perceives the 
Ukraine crisis as a threat to their country security. Poland furthermore prefers to 
form military alliances and is ready to contribute military to strengthening NATO´s 
Eastern European defence capabilities. The Polish threat perception can explain 
also the two earlier hypothesis, why Poland have taken an active diplomatic role in 
the conflict and why Poland is promoting the implementation of the EU sanctions 
even if this would mean a great economic trade loss in its agricultural sector. 
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5.3.2 The Czech Republic 
The Czech geographical position is not near Russia (unlike countries such as 
Poland) or any areas deemed important by Russia such as Kaliningrad and Black 
Sea. This geographical placement of the Czech Republic provides the country with 
a more flexible position in formulating its geographical strategy.185  
The Czech Republic is ready to contribute military to strengthening NATO´s 
Eastern European defence capabilities and has offered Gripen fighters, 300 Czech 
soldiers186, a unit of special forces (150 soldiers) and transport helicopters to 
strengthen the Alliance. The Czech president has furthermore declared his support 
for NATO deterrence operations.187 There is however a disagreement among the 
Czech representatives regarding their assessment of the situation in Ukraine. On the 
one hand, President Zeman believe that there is a civil war in Ukraine meanwhile 
the Czech foreign minister Lubomir Zaoralek, on the other hand, is more critical of 
Russia’s operation and does not challenge Russia`s engagement in Ukraine.188  
Furthermore, the Polish Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka and the Finance Minister 
Andrej Babiš find the relations with Russia mainly as an issue of economic ties and 
would like to see a lifting of the sanctions as soon as possible. For both Sobotka 
and Babiš is the main concern the future of European security order, since they do 
not find the Ukraine conflict as a potentially threat to the Czech security, but 
instead worries about economic damage done to Czech business interests.189 The 
division of the political elite in the Czech Republic is furthermore reflected in the 
public opinion in which more than 60 percent of the Czechs perceive the conflict in 
Ukraine as a security threat to their country. Only 11 percent supported any kind of 
diplomatic action regarding the Ukraine crisis and the intensification of the conflict 
have made the Czechs increasingly critical of Russia. In October 2014, two-thirds 
of the population said that Russia posed a security threat to the country, twice as 
many as a year earlier.190 
The Czech Republic´s divided stand regarding the threat perception can 
furthermore explain the country´s divided stand on the Ukraine crisis, however 
more than 60 percent of the public perceive Russia’s actions as a threat. Because of 
the fact that most of the Czech political leaders not perceive Russia´s annexation of 
Crimea as a threat and the fact that the Czech Republic choose to take a position 
against EU sanctions indicates the influence of the political leadership and is 
explained by the leaderships worries about the sanctions economic damage. The 
hypotheses, geopolitical concern, can therefore despite a divided threat perceptions 
not explain the countries stand against the EU sanctions. 
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5.3.3 Slovakia 
Fico´s interpreting the on going crisis as a geopolitical conflict between the US and 
Russia and find the EU´s involvement in the conflict as causing many small EU 
countries to suffer.191 Furthermore, the Slovak government expressed the view that 
the Russian aggression does not constitute a direct threat to their countries meaning 
that a contribution to new NATO bases not is necessary.192  
Slovakia does not perceive the Russian annexation of Crimea as a threat to 
Slovakia and will not contribute to new NATO bases. The hypothesis geopolitical 
concern therefore does not explain Slovakia´s position against tougher sanctions 
against Russia. 
5.3.4 Hungary 
Hungary strongly supported the decisions of the NATO Summit in Wales in 
September 2014, saying that `significantly improve the military security of 
Hungary and Central Europe´ and stating that `we can guarantee the security of 
Hungary only and exclusively within the framework of NATO´. However, in 
parallel to these announcements, Orbán has tried to reconcile his strong insistence 
on national interests and loyalty to principles and allies, by stating: `we have a 
geopolitical situation that is factual. These are facts. We have more powerful and 
bigger neighbours to the East and to the West. Ideals and principles are important 
but national interests are more important. Consequently, we will be loyal to our 
NATO allies even if we do not share even 50 percent of what they say and 
think´.193 
Orbán´s statement clearly state that Hungarian government prioritize Hungary´s 
national interests and that the support to NATO only is a way trying to maintain 
some sort of “good” relationship with its NATO allies. Hungary is demonstrating a 
more withdraw role regarding military security and does not seem to perceive 
Russia´s action in Ukraine as a threat. The hypothesis geopolitical concern can 
therefore not explain Hungary’s taken position against tougher sanctions on Russia. 
5.4 The Visegrad countries EU cooperation 
Hypothesis 4 consists of European Union cooperation explaining to what extent the 
V4 countries can be seen to be EU-friendly, living up to the EU's model of 
democracy. The hypothesis will also explain how and if the V4 countries 
cooperation and relation with the EU have changed due to the Ukraine crisis 
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and/or due to the countries taken stand on the implementation of tougher sanctions 
against Russia.  
5.4.1 Poland 
As the Ukraine crisis escalated, the major European powers, in particular Germany, 
decided that it was too serious an issue to be left to `hawkish´ Poland and therefore 
gradually marginalized it by extension to the whole V4 group. This resulted in a 
further undermined solidarity among the V4 countries that saw their first attempt to 
be a serious player in EU foreign affairs as very frustrating. The V4 Group however 
managed to respond to the crisis with a large degree of unity, as Visegrad foreign 
ministers were among the first to visit Ukraine and express solidarity with and 
support for the new Ukrainian leadership in 2014. As some EU heavyweights, and 
especially Germany moved into a role of handling the negotiations surrounding the 
Ukraine crisis, Poland and the other V4 countries however were marginalized, and 
differences among them resurfaced.194 Instead was the so-called Normandy quartet 
initiated consisting of negotiations between the German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and French President Francois Hollande, Russia’s President Putin and Ukraine´s 
President Petro Poroshenko. This grouping of Germany, France, Russia and 
Ukraine became the main format for political negotiations on the Ukraine crisis, 
leaving Poland outside the negotiations. Even if Poland´s political leaders might be 
frustrated about being side lined in the EU-Russia-Ukraine negotiations, Poland do 
not see (at least not in the short run) much room for a defining of a substantially 
different policy.  However was the marginalisation of Poland in the diplomatic 
process a painful setback for Warsaw´s diplomacy.195 
Poland´s current government position has positioned Poland as a promoter of 
deeper European integration, supporting Germany´s conservative and fiscal stance. 
From being the largest beneficiary of EU funds in 2014 (receiving EUR 106 bn or 4 
percent GDP per annum in terms of estimated 2014 GDP), Poland has much to gain 
from the EU membership.196 The European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2015 shows 
that Poland played an eminent role in forging the EU response to Russia´s actions 
against Ukraine, especially in the initial phase of the conflict. Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk´s tour through European capitals in February 2014 raised an 
awareness of the Ukraine crisis in the east and its far-reaching implications. 
However, even if the Poland certainly belonged to the hawks in the EU, it always 
prioritised a common EU stance over any unilateral action.197  
Poland is a promoter of deeper European integration and has much to gain from 
Europe, being the largest beneficiary of EU funds and have prioritised a common 
EU stance over any unilateral action. However, even if Poland has not pushed for 
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military support on Kyiv it seems like Poland wanted the EU to send stronger 
political signals to Russia than many of the other EU member states, this could be 
the reason resulting in that Poland was left outside the negotiations on the issue. 
Due to the strong polish EU support the fact that Poland stood in the first rank of 
countries demanding a bolder EU response towards Russia and the fact that Poland 
have much to gain from the EU cooperation, the hypothesis EU cooperation can 
explain Poland´s taken stand for tougher sanctions against Russia. 
5.4.2 The Czech Republic 
The official line on the Czech Foreign Ministry regarding the Ukraine crisis is that 
“the sanctions were unfortunately but necessary answer to the Russian aggression 
and that the EU should ultimately strive for their removal and restoration of normal 
relations with Russia, with necessary prerequisite being the compliance by Russia 
with international law and the removal of Russian soldiers and weapons.”198 The 
Czech foreign policy have however a long tendency of being the black sheep in the 
European family because of the fact that the country`s EU debate was dominated by 
Klaus, a Eurosceptic former Prime Minister and later president. Klaus prominent 
political line in the EU debate could easily get the impression that all Czechs were 
Eurosceptic. The real problem was however that there was no pro-European 
counterbalance to Klaus on the Czech domestic arena.199 Both President Zeman and 
his predecessor Klaus has committed to the Russian cause. President Zeman has 
repeatedly denied any evidence of Russian military presence in Eastern Ukraine 
and Klaus have made similar statements, adding the accusation that the West 
provoked the conflict in Ukraine.200  
A study by the Association of International Affairs, a think tank, have portrayed 
the results of the Czech approach to European issues in the 2013. The 2013 edition 
of its `Trend of Czech European Policy´ report, based on research conducted among 
elites, have presented the result that `the Czech Republic is not capable of either 
formulating or asserting its interests in the EU. However, [the elites] expect an 
improvement in this situation over the next ten years´.201 According to European 
Carnegie “the Czech Eurosceptic elites feel they have a lot in common on European 
issues with the Brits – such as a sense of splendid isolation. But for the Czech 
Republic, that isolation is self-proclaimed, the result of weak leadership and a 
decades-long lack of political vision. It will take a significant effort for Prague to 
raise its foreign policy game.”202 
The hypothesis EU cooperation cannot explain the Czech Republic stand 
against an implementation of tougher EU sanctions against Russia because of the 
fact that a pro-European counterbalance is missing on the domestic arena 
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presumably especially because of Zeman´s current (and earlier Klaus) strong 
political leadership promoting the pro-Russian line. The Czech Republic difficulties 
to formulate or asserting its interests in the EU can however to some extent be seen 
as an explanation to its weak influence in the EU. 
5.4.3 Slovakia 
 
The Prime Minister Fico have stated that Slovakia reserved the right to object to 
further EU sanctions against Russia, if the EU decides to press ahead even thou 
Slovakia have agreed to the “level-one” and “level-two” sanctions. Slovakia has 
however never been entirely supportive of the EU´s take on Russia. Fico has earlier 
criticised the Western member states for searching for unnecessary enemies (such 
as Russia) which have both lead two measures that are meaningless and harmful to 
Slovakia`s interests. 203  Fico find the EU sanctions against Russia as 
counterproductive meaning that the EU sanctions have led to escalated tensions, 
which maybe will make it more difficult finding a diplomatic solution.204 Fico 
believes that the EU instead should, abandon the sanctions expressing support for a 
ceasefire solution in Ukraine, put focus on backing efforts to forge a political 
solution to the crisis and keeping an open and intensive dialogue with Russia.205 
Fico and the Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajcak have stated 
that Slovakia conduct in the Ukraine crisis is to be a responsible EU member, 
including when it comes to the policy towards Russia.206 The type of gesture shown 
by Slovakia when Fico confirmed that he will visit Moscow to celebrate the 70th 
anniversary of the end of the Second World War, was however a risky move in the 
light of European policy and due to the fact that the event was boycotted by 
Western leaders. Yet it is not only an existing awareness of Russia´s influence that 
drives governments, but also general popular sympathy, proved by Transatlantic 
Trends in which Slovaks are among the nations with the most positive view of 
Russia. In this sense Russia have become the EU´s complement equivalent, 
someone who Slovakia can share a similar position with. Slovakia´s taken position 
demonstrating a close relationship with Russia raised during the left-wing, pro-
European Robert Fico´s governments (2006-2010 and since 2012).207 
The contradiction between Fico´s public statements at home and his 
endorsement of EU decisions in Brussels, including when it comes to the question 
of reverse the gas flow for Ukraine, can mainly be explained by domestic political 
factors.208 Fico´s government will continue to keep its double-track Eastern policy 
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even if a keeping of both lines might seem incompatible.209 Over the last years have 
Slovakia´s Eastern policy strived to maintain a support both for democratic change 
in the Eastern Partnership countries, including their European integration, and at the 
same time a pragmatic cooperation with Russia. The Ukraine crisis has shown that 
this policy mix hardly is manageable.210 Slovakia´s line aim to minimize the 
conflict between the West and Russia by supporting any step towards a diplomatic 
solution on the crisis, cancellation of sanctions and reopening prospects for trade 
liberalization between EU and Russia. Furthermore, it will provide support to 
Ukraine in implementing its agreements with the EU.211 If the situation appears that 
EU and NATO are drawn into further confrontation with Russia as a result of a 
further escalation of the Ukraine crisis, and if a clear majority of member states 
decides to toughen policy towards Russia, the government of Fico will 
accommodate. Slovakia will in this sense neither be a key driver in the conflict and 
nor a spoiler of EU and NATO policy in the Ukraine crisis. 
The hypothesis EU cooperation cannot be singled out as a crucial explanation to 
Slovakia´s stand against tougher sanctions because of the fact that Fico´s 
statements can be seen to have weakened the ties between Slovakia and the EU. 
Slovakia´s double-track Eastern policy striving to maintain a support both for 
democratic change in the Eastern Partnership countries and at the same time 
keeping a pragmatic cooperation with Russia is demonstrating a very contradictory 
Slovak position. This ambivalent position might reduce the EU countries credibility 
of Slovakia as a EU member state.    
5.4.4 Hungary 
Out of the Visegrad countries Hungary is certainly the odd one out facing 
increasingly isolation within the EU due to Hungary´s continuous setbacks of their 
democratic standards, with Orbàn openly questioning the value of democracy and 
praising alternative models of governance, such as the current one in place in 
Russia.212 The situation could lead to that Hungary becoming increasingly isolated 
from decision making at a EU level also regarding to Europe´s response to Russian 
interference in Eastern Ukraine. The most significant indicators of the shift in the 
government´s political mind set was a statement made by Orbán in Romania in July 
2014, when he said 213  `I don´t think that our (Hungary’s) European Union 
membership precludes us from building an illiberal new state based on national 
foundations´.214 Orbán´s praise of Russia in particular has risen heckles in capitals 
across Europe and in Brussels. While European governments strive for a tougher 
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line towards Russia, the Hungarian government often called for restraint.215 The 
Hungarian government have kept its more Russian-friendly policy questioned the 
rationale of the EU´s sanctions against Russia and has insisted on maintaining its 
economic relations with Russia, especially through South Stream project and the 
Paks nuclear power station.216 The complicated factor relating to the existence of a 
sizeable Hungarian minority in Ukraine, stated Prime Minister Orbán in May 2014, 
was also a statement from Orbán that received attention. Orbán stated that `Ukraine 
can be neither stable, nor democratic if it does not give its minorities, including 
Hungarians, their due. That is, dual citizenship, collective rights, and autonomy´.217 
Many in the EU, the United States, and in Ukraine, interpreted the statement as tacit 
support for Russian demands of `autonomy´ for Eastern parts of the country that 
would lead to secession.218 
Hungary has clearly showed that its rational path is to follow a more Russian-
friendly policy and Hungary has questioned the rationale of the EU sanctions. 
Orbàn´s very critical statement that Hungary´s EU membership not precludes 
Hungary from building an illiberal new state was especially staggering in the EU 
and indicated a shift in the government´s political mind set away from democratic 
standards. Hungary´s very explicit way of distance itself from the EU have resulted 
in an increasingly isolation of Hungary in the EU, which indicates that Hungary 
have been forced to sacrifice its EU relation to some extent in exchange for a clear 
Russian stand. This “move” could be seen as to safeguarding Hungary´s economic 
development and its Russian energy cooperation. 
5.5 External cooperation with non-EU countries 
Hypothesis 5 consists of External cooperation with non-EU countries and aims to 
explain the V4 countries cooperation and relation with Ukraine and Russia. The 
hypothesis will map out to what extent the V4 countries relationship with Ukraine 
and Russia has influenced the V4 countries position on the sanctions against 
Russia.  
5.5.1 Poland 
 “Poland finds itself between the devil and the deep blue see”219 and is the only EU 
and NATO member that borders both Ukraine and Russia and Poland is 
furthermore highly dependent on Russian gas and oil. Poland and Russia 
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demonstrates contradicting security identities: Poland with a transatlantic identity 
relying on cooperation, and Russia with post-imperial with an aim of self-reliance. 
The sustainability of Poland’s and Russia´s identities relies to a great extent on 
Ukraine´s strategic choice between so called transatlanticism and Eurasianism. 220  
Out of the V4 Group, only Poland is a direct neighbour of Russia via the 
Kaliningrad enclave. However, minority related connections are non-existent. The 
V4 countries have no sizeable minorities in Russia, and there is furthermore no 
Russian minority in the region.221 Poland is one of the countries most affected by 
changes in the global and regional security environment resulting from the 
Ukrainian crisis due to growing instability in Ukraine, increasingly negative 
dynamics of bi-lateral relations with Russia and ambiguous international reactions 
to the annexation of Crimea. The Ukraine crisis has led to further weakening of 
already strained Polish-Russian relations. 222  First of all, have the sanctions 
disrupted the economic exchange between the countries, second of all, is the Polish-
Russian political dialogue antagonistic on both bilateral and multilateral forums, 
third of all does the military relations remain confronted with both sides seeing 
each other as enemies and forth political high-level cultural initiatives are being 
cancelled.223  
Regarding Ukraine is Poland by far the country out of the Visegrad four who 
demonstrates the most consistent support of Ukraine. Poland played a key role in 
introducing restrictive economic measures against Russia. Furthermore, the Polish 
Foreign Minister, Radoslav Sikorski together with German and French counterparts, 
played a crucial role in brokering a deal between Ukraine´s President Yanukovych 
and the opposition, which led to a stop of the violence against Euromaidan 
protestors.224 The Polish gas import do not however mainly pass through Ukraine 
but rather through Belarus, and Poland is therefore not dependent on Ukraine in 
terms of energy transit meanwhile the other three V4 countries are almost wholly 
reliant.225  
The Ukraine crisis has weakened an already strained relation between Poland 
and Russia and resulted in negative dynamics of bi-lateral relations, which could be 
explained by the fact that Poland played a key role in introducing restrictive 
economic measures against Russia. Poland has instead chosen to show its strong 
support to Ukraine, in which Poland have kept its good relation with Ukraine. The 
Hypothesis external cooperation with non-EU countries can therefore explain 
Poland´s position on the issue due to the fact that Poland have played a crucial role 
in the negotiations to stop the violence in Ukraine and furthermore showed on a 
consistent support of Ukraine. 
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5.5.2 The Czech Republic 
Russia and the Czech Republic demonstrate a friendly relationship and cooperation 
on issues such as nuclear energy.226 The Czech Republic has traditionally been 
balanced between Russia and the West and still does, however the Ukraine crisis 
has showed indications on a shift in the country´s foreign policy to strengthen 
relations with the Western allies. In November Sobotka travelled to the United 
States for a four-day visit, which included a meeting with Vice president Joe Biden, 
and two weeks later, Sobotka met his Polish counterpart in Prague, where the 
leaders discussed the Ukraine crisis. What has appeared after these meetings is that 
the West´s attempt to influence the Czech position seems to have been successful, 
increasingly leading the Czech government to evolve its public position on an 
implementation of European sanctions towards Russia. Earlier has Sobotka raised 
concerns regarding European sanctions during the late summer and early fall in 
2014, and stated in November 2014 that the EU sanctions are hurting Russia´s 
economy and is not likely to change Russia´s behaviour. However in December, a 
subtle shift took place in Prague. The State Secretary for EU Affairs Tomas Prouza 
issued a statement from the Czech government´s perspective acknowledging that 
the EU should not consider softening the sanctions unless the Kremlin clearly 
changes its course of action in Ukraine.227 The Czech Republic still balance itself 
between the West and Russia, but Prouza´s statement indicate that Russia may no 
longer be able to count on the Czech Republic as an ally in neutralizing 
sanctions like it earlier used to.228 
Regarding the Czech Republic´s relation with Ukraine, have the Czech President 
Zeman, earned himself a poor reputation in Ukraine. Zeman have in several public 
statements criticized the Euromaidan political protest, arguing that Ukraine should 
be a non-aligned country, furthermore suggesting that Ukraine should not have 
illusions about Crimea´s return to Ukraine. In a ruthless manner in November 2014 
Zeman called Europe´s economic support of Ukraine nonsense, however according 
himself his statement did not take the country’s on-going civil war into account. 
The Czech Prime Minister Sobotka, publicly distanced himself from Zeman`s 
statements and stance on Ukraine and Ukrainian diplomats repeated that it is the 
position of the Czech government that is taken as a reference point in the relations 
with the Czech Republic. Zaoralek (the Czech minister of foreign affairs) seems to 
have managed to counterbalance Zeman´s team well in pledging support to Ukraine 
and not opposing sanctions against Russia, however neither actively promoting the 
implementation of sanctions.229 
Even if the Czech Republic continuously is demonstrating a traditionally 
balanced position between Russia and the West, have the Ukraine crisis showed 
indications on a shift in the country´s foreign policy to strengthen relations with the 
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Western allies, which in turn could weaken the Czech Republic´s relationship and 
cooperation with Russia. The Czech Republic´s bilateral meeting US seems to have 
affected the Czech Republic towards a foreign policy shift. The hypothesis external 
cooperation with non-EU country’s, regarding the Czech Republic´s talks with US 
therefore speaks against the Czech Republic´s taken position against tougher 
sanctions on Russia. Regarding the Czech Republic´s relation with Ukraine, 
Zeman´s statement seems to have weakened the relationship between the countries, 
however, Zeman´s statement can not be seen as a crucial explanation for the Czech 
Republic´s stand against an implementation of tougher sanctions. 
5.5.3 Slovakia 
Slovakia´s eastern policy has for a long time been the most Russia-oriented and 
Slovakia remains one of the most pro-Russian countries in the EU. The Ukraine 
crisis have however brought new challenges, developments in the energy sector 
open a new door for Slovakia to become more independent from Moscow and, 
ultimately, also to change its foreign policy model.230 At the same time strong 
convictions of the need to maintain good relations with Russia remains in 
government circles.231 The relationship between Russia and Slovakia however got 
strained during the autumn 2014 when Slovakia in September 2014 launched a 
reverse flow on the reconstructed Voyany-Uzhgorod pipeline to Ukraine, under 
pressure from the EU and the United States. This “move” was however strongly 
criticised by Gazprom, however Sergey Lavro (the Russian Foreign Minister) 
eventually confirmed that the reverse flow does not break the long-term contract 
with Slovakia.232 
Regarding Slovakia´s relation to Ukraine, have the Slovak government stated its 
support for Ukraine´s Association Agreement, including a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine, Moldavia, and 
Georgia, meanwhile trying to maintain good relations with Russia.233 The Slovak 
government have shown on its support for Ukraine by two initiated meetings in 
2013 created by foreign ministers of some EU country´s, in order to promote the 
signature of an association agreement with Ukraine at the Vilnius summit in 
November of that year. Slovakia has furthermore expressed its support for a new 
government in Ukraine that was the outcome of the EuroMaidan,234 as well as its 
support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and its European integration course 
towards the EU.235 Furthermore, Fico´s presidential loss last year to pro-Ukrainian 
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Andrej Kiska, indicate a wider public disagreement with the Slovak government´s 
position on the Russian-Ukraine confrontation.236 
The hypothesis external cooperation with non-EU countries can on the one hand 
explain the Slovak position against an implementation of sanctions due to its 
cooperation with Russia in the energy sector and its pro-Russian stand. However 
Slovakia´s reverse flow on a pipeline to Ukraine and Slovakia´s general support for 
the Ukraine´s integration in the EU send signals of a movement towards a more 
EU-friendly stand on the issue. All together Slovakia demonstrates a rather 
ambivalent position. 
5.5.4 Hungary 
When Orbán met Putin in Moscow in beginning of 2013 a strategic partnership was 
established called “the strategy of opening towards the East”,237 to strengthen the 
cooperation with Russia (as well as China) to be able to reap from the economic 
benefits offered by Eastern partners. This kind of policy points at the dependence 
on Russian oil and especially gas supplies.238 What could be seen as a problem with 
Hungary´s “opening towards the East” is the fact that what the “opening” consists 
of Russia´s construction of two nuclear reactors in Hungary, promotion of the 
South Stream Pipeline and agricultural trade. Russia was in 2013 the guest of 
honour at Hungary´s agricultural fair in Budapest, where a renewal of commercial 
treaties between the two states was announced. Russia could be pointed out as 
Hungary´s preferred non-EU economic partner, and furthermore also due to the 
Russia and Hungary´s announced opening of Russian-Hungarian chambers of 
commerce from Moscow to Rostov, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk or Novorosisk – all of 
them, strategic points. Taken all those different cooperation’s into consideration an 
extremely consistent diplomatic game as well as a strategic partnership is starting to 
operate at all levels. It is the Hungary´s official and legitimate representatives who 
promote strategic agreements with Moscow and who signs contracts allowing 
Russia to build two nuclear reactors in Hungary, who furthermore avoid 
condemning any Russian actions in Crimea and who promote the South Stream oil-
pipeline, blocking Ukraine.239 In November 2014, Orbán however took a stronger 
stance than before in support of Ukraine, stating that Hungary´s interest is for 
Ukraine to retain its sovereignty and to be strong, stating that Hungary we’re going 
to give all the help it could to Ukraine.240 
Hungary´s dependence on Russian energy as well as the established of the so-
called “strategy of opening towards the East” indicates a strong relationship and 
cooperation between Hungary and Russia. The hypothesis external cooperation 
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with non-EU countries can therefore be seen to explain Hungary´s position against 
tougher sanctions on Russia. However Hungary´s surprisingly turn suddenly stating 
its support for Ukraine speaks against Hungary´s strong relationship with Russia 
and could rather be considered as a strategy trying to maintain “a good tone” with 
the EU. 
5.6 Overview Table hypotheses 
Overview of the explanatory factors  “for” or “against” an implementation of 
EU sanctions against Russia 
 
Hypothesis 1 (domestic political ambitions)  
Hypothesis 2 (Business interests)  
Hypothesis 3 (geopolitical concern)  
Hypothesis 4 (EU cooperation)  
Hypothesis 5 (external cooperation with non-EU countries) 
 
Poland PRO-Sanctions Against sanctions 
Hypothesis 1 An active diplomatic role + 
Strongly PRO EU 
 
Hypothesis 2 Willing to pay a high price for 
the sanctions+ Coal holder & 
alternative gas sources + 
Pushing for a reducing of 
energy dependence on Russia 
Dependent on Russian 
gas 
Hypothesis 3 Threat perception + Wants to 
raise the costs for Russia´s 
behaviour 
 
Hypothesis 4 Promoter of EU integration + 
Obtains EU funding 
 
Hypothesis 5 Increasingly antagonistic 
Polish-Russian relation 
 
 
Czech 
Republic 
PRO-Sanctions Against sanctions 
Hypothesis 1  Ambivalent position 
between EU and Russia 
Ambivalent role between 
EU and Russia 
Hypothesis 2 Low trade with Russia + 
Gas from Norway + 
cancelled the Rosatom-led 
Temelin nuclear power 
project + Carrying oil 
imports from Germany 
Strong ties with LUK-oil 
+Receives gas & nuclear 
power from Russia 
Hypothesis 3 Czech public´s threat 
perception + Contributing 
to a strengthening of NATO 
Ambivalent role between 
EU and Russia 
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Hypothesis 4  No pro-EU line on the 
domestic arena 
Hypothesis 5 Czech foreign policy shift + 
Sobotka´s expressed 
support for Ukraine 
Traditionally balanced 
between Russia & the 
West + Zeman´s pro-
Russian statements 
 
Slovakia PRO-Sanctions Against sanctions 
Hypothesis 1  Ambivalent position 
between EU & Russia + 
Domestic calculations 
(Parliament election in 
2016) 
Political leadership  
Hypothesis 2 Dependent on EU trade Low trade with Russia + 
Dependent on Russian 
gas, oil & nuclear fuel 
Hypothesis 3  No threat perception 
Hypothesis 4 Double-track Eastern 
policy 
+ Support democratic 
change & EU integration 
in the Eastern 
Partnership 
Pragmatic cooperation 
with Russia + Criticising 
the EU 
Hypothesis 5 Shown its support for 
Ukraine  
Strong pro-Russian + 
Russian-oriented policy 
 
Hungary  PRO-Sanctions Against sanctions 
Hypothesis 1  Public divided on the 
issue + Low public 
interest 
Political leadership 
Hypothesis 2  Economic cooperation with 
Russia + 
Deep Russian investment in 
Hungary + 
Dependent on Russian gas & 
nuclear fuel 
Hypothesis 3  No threat perception 
Hypothesis 4  Russian-friendly policy + 
Condemned liberal 
democracy 
Hypothesis 5  Good relation with Russia 
 
 
  48 
6 Discussion 
The discussion aims to answer the research question; what is behind the V4 
countries different positions and lack of unity on the EU sanctions towards Russia? 
Below is the result of each one of the countries hypotheses presented highlighting 
the most strategically important hypothesis as well as reflections on the country´s 
choices. 
 
The V4 countries' different actions, priorities and perceptions have shown a 
complex playfield, which involves many different actors and their relations in 
different arenas creating a widespread network and has made a nested game visible 
in the sanction war between EU and Russia. 
Poland´s position in this nested game, responding in a consistent and forceful 
manner to Russian´s actions, could at first sight be seen as a suboptimal choice, due 
to the fact that Poland has intensive business contacts with Russia, and might not 
appear as the most rational “move” of Poland. Despite Poland´s major trade loss 
caused by the Russian retaliatory measures, Poland keeps its position promoting an 
implementation of even tougher sanctions towards Russia. However, by the 
creation of an arena dynamics looking into the five hypothesis and connect these to 
the three different arenas many new aspects become visible. Poland´s chosen 
position taking a clear stand for an implementation of the EU sanctions towards 
Russia can be seen as a rational “move” in protecting the country’s security against 
the threat that Poland considers Russia to give the appearance of. In this specific 
situation, in a sanction war between EU and Russia, Poland prioritizes its security 
environment before any other interest and thereby risks its energy security and its 
relation to Russia. By doing so Poland however kept a fine balance between its 
international arena supporting Ukraine and at the same time the supranational arena 
supporting the Western Unity. Furthermore, Poland has succeeded in getting its 
public on board, showing a majority support for an implementation of sanctions, 
which indicates that Poland has managed to influence the domestic policy also in 
the supranational arena. Because the political games are nested into a web of 
different countries goal achievement and difficulty to keep a balance between all 
the different games, the countries choices come at a price. In Poland´s case this 
“price” consists of a weakening of the Russian relationship and a great trade loss 
for the maintenance of the country´s security. 
The Czech Republic´s strategy in this nested game has shown to be an 
ambivalent position sending signals of its support to both Russia and the EU trying 
to keep a balance between Russia and the West. The Czech ambivalent position can 
be perceived as rational due to the fact that the Czech Republic did not shut the 
door to any of it´s on-going games, neither on the supranational arenas nor on the 
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international arena. At the same time an ambivalent position can appear to be 
suboptimal due the fact that it may be perceived as unclear even if the country itself 
might have carefully reflected upon its multipath position and taken all on-going 
games into consideration. However, the Czech strategy appear to be a bit vague 
because of the fact that both President Zeman and the Prime Minister Sobotka have 
chosen a more clear position on the issue, criticising the EU sanctions, addressing 
their non threat perception, and instead highlighting their worry for the country´s 
economic damage. From Zeman and Sobotka´s acting to judge, promoting a pro-
Russian line, the country's priority is to protect its business interest in fear of 
economic damage. What furthermore could explain the Czech position is the fact 
that there is no counterbalance to Zeman´s strong political leadership promoting a 
pro-Russian line. The fact that a counterbalance is missing makes it difficult for the 
Czech republic to maintain its game on the supranational arena (its political EU 
cooperation) and might make it more difficult for the Czech Republic to get its 
voice heard in the EU negotiations. The Czech Republic can be perceived as torn 
between two different rational strategies. The one game strategy can be considered 
to take a more EU-friendly position (a position pro-sanctions). The Czech Republic 
will not be much affected from an implementation of further sanctions due to its 
relatively low trade with Russia and its willing to contribute to a strengthening of 
NATO. At the same time the Czech Republic seems to have taken small steps away 
from Russia by Sobotka´s outspoken support for Ukraine and the governments 
cancelling of the Temelin nuclear power plant. However, this could mean that the 
Czech Republic is risking its relation with Russia. The other game can be 
considered to take a more rational Russian-friendly position, in which the Czech 
Republic have a lot to gain from keeping a strong relationship with Russia 
especially due to its gas, and nuclear cooperation even if the country is not fully 
dependent on Russian energy. Within this position the Czech Republic is acting 
“the safe way” by securing its trade and energy cooperation with Russia and there 
through avoiding economic damages or a weakening with its Russian relationship. 
Slovakia´s strategy on the nested game arena has shown to be an ambivalent one 
but has at the same time strongly been influenced from the country's strong pro-
Russian leader (Fico). Fico´s political leadership keeping a pro-Russian rhetoric 
can from a nested game theory perspective be seen as a rational “move”, both in 
mobilising his own electorate in the parliamentary election 2016 and at the same 
time safeguarding Slovakia´s energy source by keeping up a good Slovak-Russian 
relationship on the international arena. In this way Fico manages to keep a balance 
between both the domestic- and the international game arena, and at the same time 
safeguarding the country’s energy source. The fact that Slovakia is nearly fully 
dependent on Russian gas, oil and nuclear fuel, explains why it is rational for 
Slovakia to maintain its close ties to Russia. However, Fico´s strategy, which 
appears to be a balanced game between the domestic and international arena, can 
also be perceived as suboptimal. Slovakia´s pro-Russian line makes it difficult for 
Slovakia to maintain its EU cooperation also due to Fico´s outspoken critics against 
the Western member states. Slovakia seems to have entangled itself into this nested 
game by holding on to a policy mix hardly manageable. Slovakia wants to 
  50 
minimize the conflict between the West and Russia by supporting any steps towards 
a diplomatic solution and wants at the same time to see a cancellation of the 
sanctions and a reopening prospect for trade liberalization between EU and Russia. 
Considering Slovakia´s policy mix with the aim to solve the conflict without really 
taken a clear stand can be seen as difficult to achieve because of the fact that a 
rational “move” have consequences in all arenas. Tsebelis argue that an optimal 
alternative in one arena (or game) will not necessarily be optimal with respect to the 
entire network of arenas. This means that Slovakia´s rational “move” (its position 
against sanctions) can lead to a suboptimal situation on another arena (a wakening 
of its the EU cooperation) however, the chosen “move” is still the most optimal 
choice for Slovakia (but a weakening of the EU is cooperation necessary to achieve 
that goal). 
Hungary´s rational strategy in this nested game is to respond with a clear 
repudiation against an implementation of tougher sanctions and against the EU´s 
actions regarding the conflict, and is furthermore demonstrating a shift away from 
liberal democratic values. The Hungarian strategy can be considered rational when 
taking all arenas into account. First of all, the Hungarian government is determined 
to protect its economic interests (both because of its economic cooperation and 
energy dependence on Russia) but also because Orbàn cannot afford any increase 
in gas prices. This means that Orbán is nested in a game in which he has to satisfy 
the public opinion in keeping the gas prices low which means that he must keep his 
close relationship to Russia to secure the country´s energy source. At the same time 
is Hungary a member of the EU and NATO, which on the other hand speaks against 
Hungary´s pro-Russian stand. However, with the understanding for Hungary´s 
economic prioritize Hungary presumable find itself to gain more form a pro-
Russian stand than from cooperation with the EU and NATO. Taking the 
supranational arena into account one can distinguish that Hungary´s distancing 
from EU come at a price and have resulted in an increasingly isolation of Hungary 
in the EU. This indicate that Hungary´s rational game on the domestic and 
international arena is changing the game for Hungary at the supranational arena, in 
which Hungary seems to have weakened its EU relation and from now on might 
have a difficult time to take part in the EU negotiations. 
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7 Conclusion 
The results of the research show that the countries positions and decisions within 
the three arenas, from their point of view, can be explained as rational choices and 
strategically decisions taken in the nested game surrounding the sanction war 
against Russia. Due to the fact that each of the V4 countries act rational to 
maximize their goal achievement, a coherence problem occur, which causes a lack 
of unity on the EU sanctions towards Russia. 
The research reveals that to be able to understand the V4 countries' rational 
strategies (or suboptimal choices), it is important to include all explanatory factors 
to be able to single out which of the explanatory factors that have played the 
decisive role for the country's position. A country's position can be perceived as 
suboptimal but the nested game theory helps us to see that countries always make 
rational decisions based on what can be considered as most rational for the country 
itself. However, if we would not include all the explanatory factors it would be 
difficult to single out which explanatory factor that the country´s rational choice is 
based on. Analysing the sanction war in the light of nested games provides us with 
an indication of how incredibly complex the collaboration among the V4 countries 
is and helps us to understand why a seemingly irrational decision can prove to be 
rational. By trying to solve this giant nested game, namely the V4 countries 
positions in the sanction war between the EU and Russia it has appeared that the 
countries positions are far more complex than we ever could have imagined and if 
we would have been apart of the “real” game maybe even more complex aspects 
could have been included in the game. 
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